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Cost and schedule overrun plague over 50% of all construction projects, 
engendering diminished available funding that leads to deferred maintenance and 
impaired award ability for needed projects. Though existing research attempts to identify 
overrun’s sources, the results are inconclusive and frequently differ. Accordingly, this 
research reviews DoD construction contract data from the past ten years to identify the 
contract attributes of 79,894 projects that correlate with superior performance for use in 
future project execution. This research starts with creating a database that houses the 
largest single source of construction contract information. The research then evaluates the 
data to determine if differences in project performance exist when comparing contracting 
agents, funding agents, and award months. Next, the research utilizes stepwise logistic 
regression to determine the significant contract attributes and predict future projects’ 
overrun likelihoods. Model accuracy for predicting the likelihood of cost and schedule 
overrun is 65% and 75%, respectively. Finally, this research concludes by providing 
insights into efforts that could improve modeling accuracies, thereby informing better 
risk management practices. This research is expected to support public and private sector 
planners in their ongoing efforts to execute construction projects more cost-effectively 




I would like to express my love, appreciation, and admiration for my wife and 
children. Throughout this process, they have provided me the necessary guidance, 
support, and grounding to help complete this enormous endeavor. Thank you all so much 
for reminding me of what truly matters. To my thesis partner, Tyler, I want to thank you 
for your hard work and dedication to this project, and more importantly, for your 
friendship. Your positive outlook and honesty were continuously refreshing and 
inspiring. To my advisor, Lt Col Steven Schuldt, thank you for your candor, 
uncompromising reviews, and steadfast leadership throughout this process. Your tireless 
work has made this thesis something I can truly be proud of. To my committee members 
Carlton Hendrix and Dr. Brent Langhals, thank you for your technical support and 
expertise, without which this research would not have been possible. I would be remiss if 
I also failed to mention my immense gratitude for the guidance and reviews offered by 
Major Justin Delorit. Finally, to my classmates, thank you for your unfailing comradery. 
In these trying times, your friendships have been a wellspring of renewal and hope - till 
we meet again 21M! 
 






First, I would like to thank God for this experience and challenge of an AFIT 
Master’s program. It has been such a blessing to have this as my first assignment and to 
be stationed together with my wife. Thank you for your support and encouragement 
throughout this program. We have built so many memories here, cheers to what is to 
come! Adam, my thesis partner, thank you for endeavoring this crazy time with me. I am 
grateful for our friendship and the many memories shared!  Lt Col Steven Schuldt, my 
academic advisor, thank you for your mentorship and guidance in our thesis process but 
also in career and personal development. I have grown immensely in my time at AFIT 
because of your direct influence. Carlton Hendrix, our thesis sponsor at the Air Force 
Civil Engineering Center, thank you for the thesis spark you provided Adam and Me. To 
start with your idea and cast the sails into the wind has been a rewarding challenge that I 
am grateful for. Dr. Langhals, thank you for the many hours of coding and data analytics 
expertise you provided. Our thesis would not be where it is at without your help. Major 
Delorit, thank you as well for your willingness to support our thesis from the conceptual 
phase to final reviews on articles, your contributions have been invaluable. Finally thank 
you to my fellow GEM students. I have been able to vicariously live through your CE 
experiences and learn such a breadth of knowledge through you. Most importantly 
though, thank you for our friendships. It has been such a blessing to endure AFIT with 
everyone. I cannot wait to see and hear the awesome things all of you will be doing in the 
future. 
       Tyler S. Stout 
vii 
2. Table of Contents 
Page 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. vii 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................x 
I.  Introduction .....................................................................................................................1 
Background ...................................................................................................................1 
Problem Statement ........................................................................................................3 
Research Objectives .....................................................................................................4 
Thesis Organization ......................................................................................................6 
II. Literature Review ............................................................................................................8 
Chapter Introduction .....................................................................................................8 
Cost Overrun ................................................................................................................8 
Schedule Delay ...........................................................................................................16 
III.  United States Department of Defense (DoD) Real Property Repair, Alterations, 
Maintenance, and Construction Project Contract Data: 2009-2020 ..................................26 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................26 
Specifications Table ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Value of the Data ........................................................................................................28 
Data Description .........................................................................................................29 
Experimental Design, Material, and Methods ............................................................30 
IV.  A Two-Stage Statistical Prediction Framework for Predicting Construction Cost and 




Background/Literature Review ..................................................................................42 





V.  Conclusions and Recommendations - Using Construction Contract Data to Improve 
Decision Making and Project Performance .......................................................................73 
Article Summary ........................................................................................................73 
The Problem ...............................................................................................................73 
Analyzing the Data .....................................................................................................75 
Moving Forward .........................................................................................................77 
Conclusion – Mitigating Overruns in DoD Construction ...........................................80 
Research Significance ................................................................................................80 
Research Contributions ..............................................................................................81 





3. List of Figures 
Page 
Figure 4-1 Number of DoD construction projects awarded by month from fiscal year 
2010 through fiscal year 2020. .................................................................................. 50 
Figure 4-2 Historical trend of cost and schedule overrun occurrence by project award 
month. ......................................................................................................................... 51 
Figure 4-3 Historical trend of cost overrun occurrence by project award duration. The 
number of projects awarded by month and overrun category is also annotated by the 
number within each column. ...................................................................................... 52 
Figure 4-4 Ideological methodical approach. Two main methods were utilized: 1) 
Logistic Regression to determine cost and/or schedule overrun likelihood and 2) 
Random Forest Classification to determine magnitude of overrun. .......................... 53 
Figure 4-5 Stepwise logistic regression process: Variable selection and accuracy 
determination. ............................................................................................................ 57 
Figure 4-6 Summary of the direction and magnitude of the most influential attributes for 
all eight likelihood models, based on the attribute logistic regression coefficient 
values. Each column represents the top attributes of the respective models. This color 
chart uses green to represent an increase in overrun probability, red to represent a 
decrease in overrun probability, and black to indicate an insignificant attribute. 
Lighter colors represent attributes with lower influence, whereas darker colors 
represent those attributes with higher influence. ....................................................... 61 
Figure 5-1 Summary of DoD Construction Contract Performance .................................. 74 
 
x 
4. List of Tables 
Page 
Table 3-1 Description of Data ........................................................................................... 27 
Table 3-2 Description of Attributes in the Dataset ........................................................... 32 
Table 4-1 Data breakdown by military branch subset: Number of projects, historical cost 
overrun occurrence, and historical schedule overrun occurrence. ........................... 49 
Table 4-2 Contract attributes used for analysis with their associated type, category, and 
a brief explanation of what the attribute represents within the data. ........................ 55 
Table 4-3 Models used in random forest classification to classify magnitude of cost and 
schedule overruns. ...................................................................................................... 60 
Table 4-4 Measures of performance for cost and schedule overrun logistic regression 
models. ....................................................................................................................... 63 
Table 4-5 Random forest classification model accuracy compared with the no 
information rate for all cost and schedule overrun models. ...................................... 64 
1 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DOD CONSTRUCTION TASK ORDER 
PERFORMANCE 
 
1. I.  Introduction 
Background 
More than half of all construction projects exceed their target budget or schedule 
(Assaf et al. 1995; Habibi et al. 2018a; Ramanathan et al. 2012a). Department of Defense 
(DoD) construction projects are no exception (Dicks et al. 2017; Thal et al. 2010). The 
DoD was authorized $26.7 billion in fiscal year 2020 to construct, repair, alter, maintain, 
and modernize its 585,000 facilities and associated infrastructure (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 2019). Despite this 
considerable funding, there remains an estimated $116 billion maintenance project 
backlog (Cronk 2018). This backlog is made worse by a consistently underfunded yearly 
sustainment model and represents an increasing financial risk (Serbu 2015; USGAO 
United States Goverment Accountability Office 2019). Therefore, properly executing 
these projects and developing strategies for mitigating overruns and delays is crucial in 
reducing the project backlog. 
The consequences of cost overruns and delays are manifest throughout the DoD. 
These issues lead to overtasked contracting and construction personnel, alter planned 
budgets affecting construction programs, and can even limit the ability to award future 
projects (Alleman et al. 2020). Deferring projects can result in delays in mission-essential 
readiness, missed requirements, lower morale, and reduced effectiveness (Mills et al. 
2017; Roulo 2015). Furthermore, cost and schedule overrun can lead to a need to use 
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funds from the fixed operations and maintenance budget (Congressional Research 
Service 2019).  
Identifying the sources of delays and cost overrun in the construction industry has 
been an ongoing effort for at least 40 years (Rowland 1981). However, according to most 
research, overrun sources vary from region-to-region, owner-to-owner, and project-to-
project, with no single agreed-upon source. One previous study shows that the only 
underlying reason for cost overrun is design change (Chang 2002), while another 
identifies 73 different causes (Assaf and Al-Hejji 2006). Accordingly, this research 
investigates the primary causes of DoD construction project cost overrun and schedule 
delay.  
Previous studies that analyzed construction performance using contract attributes 
have garnered considerable insights into the factors that significantly affect performance 
(Al-Momani 2000; Bordat et al. 2004; Lu et al. 2017; Rowland 1981). However, no 
studies have used DoD contract information at the scale to which this research attempts, 
to the authors’ knowledge. Therefore, this review and analysis of the DoD’s construction 
portfolio’s past performance based on contract data could help determine future work’s 
optimal execution strategy.  
The U.S. government requires funding oversight and tracking for all contracts 
greater than $10 thousand. The DoD has used the Federal Procurement Database System 
– Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to track construction contracts meeting this requirement, 
making it the most relevant and complete contract data source (“Federal Procurement 
Data System - Next Generation” n.d.). Accordingly, the DoD could use information from 
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this database to analyze its entire project portfolio and potentially reduce the occurrences 
and magnitude of cost overrun and schedule delay. 
Problem Statement 
The United States Federal Government has enacted several policy changes 
regarding the execution of construction projects and the divestment practices of existing 
infrastructure to mitigate the project backlog. The realignment of the National Defense 
Strategy and implementation of base realignment and closure attempt to reduce the 
amount of infrastructure the DoD must maintain (“Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC)” n.d.; Serbu 2015). Newer project execution strategies, including enhanced use 
leases, public-private-partnerships, and use of condition assessments, have also been 
implemented to help curb ongoing maintenance costs (Aragon 2018; “Facilities 
Investment & Management” n.d.; Herrera 2019). While these efforts do much to reduce 
recurring expenses, funding shortfalls persist (Serbu 2019).  
DoD facilities and infrastructure condition directly affect the military’s capability 
and mission readiness, with service branches deliberately putting off mission-critical 
infrastructure projects because of the inability to fund them (Serbu 2015). Deferring 
maintenance to facilities and infrastructure because of budget shortfalls can quickly turn 
into a need to restore or modernize those same issues years later. Allowing further 
infrastructure degradation through maintenance deferment can ultimately lead to an 
increased cost for repairs (Deferred Maintenance: The Cost of Doing Nothing 2016). 
Therefore, a means to further mitigate this underfunding is needed.  
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This thesis seeks to identify construction contracting data attributes that 
significantly correlate to a project’s ability to be completed within budget and delivered 
on-time. The DoD can avoid those attributes of contract data correlated with a greater 
cost overrun and schedule delay frequency or magnitude based on risk tolerance. 
Conversely, those correlated with better performance can be implemented on a greater 
number of projects to potentially mitigate cost and schedule overrun and further aid in 
diminishing the backlog of DoD construction projects and maintaining mission-readiness. 
Research Objectives 
The DoD can improve their management practices and possibly mitigate the need for 
unforeseen funding requests for future construction programming by identifying the 
contract attributes positively and negatively correlated with project performance. This 
research is expected to support military planners in their ongoing efforts to execute DoD 
construction projects more cost-effectively and responsibly utilize DoD funds, which 
contribute to maintaining the U.S. as the world’s preeminent fighting force.  
Due to the inconclusive nature and scope of current research, this study investigates 
sources of schedule and cost overrun within DoD construction project contract data. The 
specific research objectives within this project are determining: 
1. the sources of cost and schedule overrun for construction contracts using the 
attributes contained within FPDS;  
2. which execution agents and contract delivery methods are more effective at 
staying on budget and schedule;  
3. if locally contracted projects perform better than centrally managed projects; 
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4. if the contract award date impacts the overall project performance in cost and 
schedule metrics; and 
5. the likelihood and magnitude of a DoD construction project to experience an 
overrun. 
This research’s objectives align directly with the priorities outlined in the 
National Defense Strategy, specifically “Working with military engineering contracting 















Thesis Organization  
The following sections comprise this thesis: 
• Chapter Two – A literature review of the current body of knowledge that focuses 
on cost and schedule overrun. This high-level overview provides information on 
common sources of overrun. This chapter also discusses how the categorization of 
literature follows techniques used to determine those overrun sources, including 
qualitative and quantitative methods. Each section of the chapter concludes by 
discussing the gaps within the current research. 
• Chapter Three – Publication One – “United States Department of Defense (DoD) 
Real Property Repair, Alterations, Maintenance, and Construction Project 
Contract Data: 2009- 2020.” This publication covers how the contract data were 
procured from the Federal Procurement Database System and transformed into a 
working DoD construction project database. The publication covers the 
compilation of 62 unique attributes for 132,665 projects into a single source, 
offering military planners the ability to perform analyses on the DoD’s execution 
capability. These data also translate well for the private sector as they closely 
mirror work conducted in this area. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the most 
extensive open-source data of its kind. This article was published in Elsevier’s 
Data-In-Brief journal with a CiteScore of 1.5 (Stout et al. 2020). 
• Chapter Four – Publication Two – International Journal of Project Management: 
“A Two-Stage Statistical Prediction Framework for Predicting Construction Cost 
and Schedule Overrun.” This article analyzes the contract data of 79,894 projects 
from the past 11 years to determine those contract attributes significantly 
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correlated with a project’s ability to remain within budget and be delivered on-
time. The regression model developed for this analysis is then used in concert 
with testing and validation data sets to predict the likelihood of cost overrun and 
schedule delay. Additionally, a random forest algorithm is also applied to the data 
to categorize the expected magnitude of overrun a project will experience. Project 
programmers, planners, and managers alike can use this information to aid them 
in identifying projects that are likely to experience overrun. By identifying these 
at-risk projects, construction professionals can attempt to mitigate their effects. 
This paper has been submitted to the International Journal of Project Management 
(2021) for publication. 
• Chapter Five – Publication Three – The Military Engineer: “Using Construction 
Contract Data to Improve Decision Making and Project Performance.” This paper 
covers the investigation and outcome of a study conducted to identify the sources 
of cost and schedule overrun within DoD construction. Contract data are 
compared with performance indicators to determine which attributes increase the 
likelihood of overruns and how this information can be used to improve project 
planning. In addition, suggestions for the improvements of modeling efforts is 
also discussed. This article also serves as the summary and conclusion of the 
thesis. This paper has been submitted to The Military Engineer (2021) for 
publication in their May-June project delivery issue. Chapter five also includes 




2. II. Literature Review 
Chapter Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of the body of knowledge 
surrounding cost overrun and schedule delay within construction. This chapter begins by 
defining cost overrun and its prevalence within this industry. It then discusses the 
findings of literature and those most commonly identified causal factors according to the 
methods utilized to include both qualitative and quantitative efforts. A similar format 
including predictive measures and mitigation sections are used in outlining the body of 
knowledge that currently exists for schedule delay. Finally, the chapter ends with a 
summary of the current literature limitations and research opportunities. 
Cost Overrun 
Cost overrun is a persistent and widespread issue plaguing the construction 
industry. Studies report that nearly 50% of all construction projects experience cost 
overrun (Ramanathan et al. 2012a) with an average growth of 8-12% (Love et al. 2013; 
Odeck 2004a; Turcotte 1996). The additional funds needed to cover construction 
overruns are frequently resolved with money earmarked to execute future construction 
projects. Planners use a host of other mitigation tactics to combat cost overrun, including 
the addition of contingency funds to account for the inherent uncertainty in cost 
estimation and unpredictable risks throughout the project (Yehiel 2013). Contingencies 
may be effective at securing money for unexpected circumstances; however, they do not 
identify or reduce the sources of cost overrun. Many researchers have attempted to 
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qualify and quantify sources of cost overrun in construction, though the studies’ 
conclusions mostly do not concur.  
Construction project characteristics and external factors frequently lead to cost 
overruns. Construction project characteristics include project size (Creedy et al. 2010; 
Islam et al. 2019a; Love 2002; Love et al. 2013; Odeck 2004a), project type (Creedy et 
al. 2010; Islam et al. 2019a; Love 2002; Love et al. 2013), design issues (Polat et al. 
2014), and scope changes (Creedy et al. 2010; Kaliba et al. 2009; Kuprenas and Nasr 
2003). External factors that lead to cost overrun include weather (Kaliba et al. 2009), 
unforeseen conditions (Alleman et al. 2020), and human influence such as management 
practices   (Dada 2014; Turcotte 1996) and philosophy and politics (Cantarelli et al. 2010, 
2012). The causal factors associated with cost growth not only differ based on project-
specific attributes but can vary between studies based on the differences in focus areas 
and levels of analysis (e.g., statistical analysis of surveys vs. regression analysis of 
contract data). The literature investigating cost overrun can generally be categorized into 
two groups based on the methods employed to determine its cause: (1) qualitative 
research, including surveys and group decision making; and (2) quantitative research, 
including descriptive statistics and modeling. 
Qualitative Research 
The first step in most researchers’ analysis of cost overruns is often defining the 
scope of the problem through extensive literature review. This review provides 
researchers with a foundation to proceed by identifying specific areas of interest. Even if 
researchers already have a particular purpose or scope of research regarding cost overrun, 
they all use literature to discover where the current body of knowledge stands. From this 
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point, researchers build theories and form hypotheses on what factors may contribute to 
cost overruns. At the lowest level, the analysis may end here, merely offering theories as 
justifications to cost overrun and calling for further research (Cantarelli et al. 2010). 
These theories often provide the impetus for research, which seeks to identify 
causal factors for project cost overrun to apply mitigation tactics. One such approach 
involves eliciting expert opinions via surveys and interviews, as experts have firsthand 
field knowledge of construction projects and the varying factors that influence project 
cost performance. In a first-of-its-kind analysis, Rosenfeld (2014) evaluated 146 studies 
and surveyed 200 construction professionals to identify causal factors for cost overrun 
that universally applied to all construction projects. Rosenfeld tasked the engineers with 
ranking the five most influential factors to cost overrun based on their experiences. The 
aggregated opinions revealed premature bid documents, too many changes by the owner, 
and suicide bidding (i.e., bidding an unreasonable low amount for the sole purpose of 
being awarded the project) as top factors, while strikes, bad weather, regulation changes, 
and accidents receiving the fewest votes. While this study's results provide a thorough 
synthesis of information on the causes of cost overrun, the author indicates that it still 
requires local ranking for applicability and would rely on others' experience and expertise 
to implement.  
Additional studies that focus on the causes of cost overruns that are region-, 
construction-, or even respondent-specific have also provided valuable, albeit conflicting, 
information. Polat et al. (2014) reported that design problems were the top factor 
contributing to cost overrun in Turkish micro-scaled construction. Unlike Rosenfeld's 
results, and when analyzing groups of factors, no one group was significantly more likely 
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to experience cost overrun than another. In another study on road projects in Zambia, 60 
Zambian construction workers voted weather as the top factor in cost overrun. Though, 
like Rosenfeld, interviewees voted scope changes as the next highest-ranking factor 
(Kaliba et al. 2009).  
Modified fuzzy group decision analysis (MFGDA), which is similar to surveys, is 
another qualitative technique one researcher used to identify and rank the influence of 
factors. Islam et al. (2019) used survey data and metadata of the interviewees to weigh 
the respective responses. The authors surveyed 60 experts on powerplant construction 
using a Likert scale to rank various cost overrun factors from the literature. The results 
were then transformed based on the respondents’ position and experience. Unlike 
previous studies, Islam et al. (2019) identified government bureaucracy as the most 
significant contributor to cost overrun in powerplant construction in Bangladesh. These 
varying results identify the issues related to the use of surveys in pinpointing the factors 
associated with overrun. It has also been shown that respondents' experiences can 
introduce bias and error into research (Kumaraswamy and Chan 1998), further 
undermining their results. 
Quantitative Research 
While qualitative analysis techniques often focus broadly on factors that relate to 
cost overrun by extracting summaries from literature reviews and opinions from field 
experts through surveys, quantitative analysis techniques review and analyze trends 
seeking to answer specific questions using construction project data such as initial and 
final cost and the number of modifications. At a fundamental level, researchers may use 
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quantitative analysis to purely describe their project data. They can extrapolate 
proportions and percentages as the means of comparison among various categories.  
In a study on the relationship between cost overrun and scope creep of 90 
projects, Kuprenas and Nasr (2003) determined that the magnitude of creep directly 
affected the amount of overrun experienced, especially in the design phase. Other 
research conducted by Woo et al. (2017), using the contract data from 513 projects, found 
that contractors' poor performance led to the most significant amount of cost escalation 
on projects. Turcotte (1996) concluded that design errors were the most significant source 
of avoidable cost growth in 102 Florida Department of Transportation projects.  
These techniques provide analysts with a first glance and foundation to build their 
research efforts, though they fail to provide any statistical significance or confidence 
level on their findings. However, access to past and present projects' performance can 
provide planners with the attributes that are most frequently associated with overrun as 
well as the data necessary to analyze, mitigate, and possibly prevent cost overrun through 
discussion of changing management practices or quality control (Turcotte 1996). 
When robust construction contract databases are not available, researchers must 
carefully use descriptive statistics to relate factors to cost overrun. Without the 
accompanying statistical significance, the findings may lack internal or external 
reliability and validity. Accordingly, hypothesis testing often includes the difference in 
means and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to support their results. In one such 
use of these statistical techniques, Love et al. (2013) found that although 276 Australian 
construction projects experienced an average of 12% cost overrun; an in-depth statistical 
analysis revealed no significant differences in overrun concerning project size or type.  
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Hypothesis testing is also commonly paired with the qualitative component of 
surveys to obtain additional insights on those factors affecting cost overrun that may not 
be found in contract data, or that may not be readily available for comparison. For 
instance, Dada (2014) determined that cordiality among teams played a significant role in 
reducing overrun in 274 projects. Additional research by Love (2002) discovered that 
51% of overrun could be attributed to rework based on data from 161 respondents, but 
that there were no significant differences between procurement method or project type on 
the magnitude of cost overrun experienced. Alleman et al. (2020) analyzed change orders 
by investigating 162 projects and interviewing 12 owners. The authors concluded that 
unforeseen conditions, owner-directed changes, and design errors most commonly led to 
cost overrun. However, there appeared to be no difference in mean cost overrun between 
several contracting methods (e.g., design-bid-build and design-build).  
The conclusions drawn from hypothesis testing may also lead analysts to conduct 
subsequent modeling of their data to better understand the causes of, and possibly predict, 
overrun. Anastasopoulos et al. ( 2014) used binary probabilistic modeling to identify the 
likelihood of a project to experience overrun based on several factors, including planned 
duration and cost estimate for 601 Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP). Through the use of 
similar methods, Gkritza and Labi (2008) produced a statistically significant model that 
calculates the probability of highway projects to experience cost overrun using factors 
like project complexity, duration, and initial cost. Touran and Lopez (2006) used Monte 
Carlo simulations that predict the likelihood of certain thresholds of cost overrun a 
project may experience but require the input of an anticipated level of overrun that will 
occur, making it more useful to those with experience in the industry.  
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Project managers and owners can better manage the risks associated with cost 
overrun if they can determine the scale or magnitude of the overrun a project may 
experience. Researchers have accomplished this objective using different methods, 
including Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) and machine learning. MLR models have 
been utilized to predict the magnitude of cost overrun based on contract characteristics 
such as the period of performance and budgeted cost (Anastasopoulos et al. 2014; Gkritza 
and Labi 2008). However, comparisons between studies using MLR will often yield 
different results on the factors affecting cost overrun. In one case, Creedy et al. (2010) 
analyzed contract data from 231 highway projects and concluded that cost overrun was 
more due to uncertainty than risk. Jahren and Ashe (1991) used regression and 
determined that the difference between the owner’s estimate and awarded contract price 
was the most significant cause of cost overrun among 1,561 Navy projects. Still, others 
have shown the significance of the contract award date using similar analysis techniques 
(Thal et al. 2010).  
Processes like supervised machine learning classification techniques offer the 
ability to analyze the relationships between variables while allowing the use of data that 
may otherwise be unfit for use in MLR. Classification attempts to categorize construction 
projects into predetermined cost overrun categories based on some given input 
parameters rather than predicting the exact magnitude. These models use past 
construction project data to learn trends and to create a model that predicts the category 
of cost overrun, with some specified accuracy, on future construction projects. Williams 
and Gong (2014) used this process to test the hypothesis that analyzing a project 
description through data mining may better predict cost overrun. Their analysis of 
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highway construction projects revealed that when a project description contains words 
such as “binder” or “sand,” cost overrun is more likely due to the complexities associated 
with those projects. To further test this theory, they compared multiple classification 
techniques, which predicted cost overrun based on the project description, and 
determined that stacked ensembles provided the highest accuracy. Using a stacked 
ensemble, they accurately classified 43.27% of projects into the correct cost overrun 
category. They further concluded that classification models are better at categorizing 
projects with high cost overrun (Williams and Gong 2014).  
Though modeling and quantitative analysis are increasingly popular in this 
research field, analysts need to give model quality a higher consideration and priority 
(van Wee 2007). One series of studies dismisses quantitative analysis as the proper way 
to determine factors for cost overrun. As data becomes more available and research 
progresses, cost overrun should trend downward. However, cost overrun trends appear to 
remain constant, thereby attributing economics, politics, and psychology to the potential 
dominant underlying factors (Cantarelli et al. 2010, 2012). As cost overrun continues to 
be an ever-present and unfavorable issue afflicting construction, research is still 
necessary to rule out those causal factors that significantly impact both the likelihood and 
magnitude of overrun. This research should focus on identifying those specific attributes 
associated with the cost overrun of DoD construction contract data and provide its 
probability and potential magnitude. 
The Way Forward 
Despite the significant contributions of the aforementioned research studies, there 
continues to be a lack of consensus on which factors consistently cause cost overrun. 
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Through the direct analysis of more than 79,000 Department of Defense construction 
projects, the factors associated with cost overrun, as found in contract data, can be 
ascertained. By identifying these factors, projects that are found to be at higher risk for 
cost overrun can also be identified. Additional mitigation techniques can be applied to 
future projects containing these factors to reduce or possibly prevent cost overrun. By 
reducing both the quantity and magnitude of cost overrun, this research adds to those 
programs already in place to reduce the nearly $16.8 billion backlog of sustainment 
projects currently maintained by the DoD.  
Schedule Delay 
Schedule delay is a pervasive issue in the construction industry, with as many as 
50% of projects experiencing schedule delay (Al-Momani 2000; Assaf and Al-Hejji 
2006). Additionally, schedule delays are frequently the source of increased and 
unforeseen costs associated with additional overhead incurred on a project (Assaf and Al-
Hejji 2006; Rowland 1981; Semple et al. 1994a). Despite the prevalence of construction 
delays, it is difficult to identify the frequency and magnitude of root causes. Studies have 
sought to identify the causative factors associated with delays for more than 50 years. 
These research studies have utilized (1) qualitative methods, including surveys and 
literature reviews; and (2) quantitative methods, including case studies, regression, and 
computer modeling. The results of qualitative research provide importance factors or rank 
general causes of delay (Faridi and El-Sayegh 2006; Frimpong et al. 2003; Habibi et al. 
2018; Kumaraswamy and Chan 1998; Prasad et al. 2018), while quantitative analysis 
offers insights into those attributes that result in, or predict the likelihood or magnitude 
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of, delay based on information collected from construction project data (Al-Momani 
2000; Bhargava et al. 2010; Bordat et al. 2004; Maharjan and Shrestha 2018a; Rowland 
1981; Zhang et al. 2019). 
Qualitative Research  
Questionnaires and surveys identify factors associated with construction delays 
(Habibi et al. 2018a). Surveys have contributed a great deal of information regarding the 
causes of delays by focusing their efforts on key stakeholders' expertise regarding 
specific project types and phases of construction. In doing so, parties involved in projects 
can use these results to predict, manage, or even mitigate the potential sources of 
schedule delay (Ahmed et al. 2003; Aibinu and Odeyinka 2006; Bhargava et al. 2010; 
Habibi et al. 2018a; Larsen et al. 2016a). In their study on the effects of project type on 
causes of schedule delay, Prasad et al. (2018)  found that the respondents in India 
regarded financial issues as a relatively consistent and high-ranking cause of delay. This 
is likely due to the projects' locations and the developing nation status associated with the 
region. What this paper ultimately determines, however, is that each of the sectors of 
construction (transportation, power, building, and water) vary in their rankings of similar 
causes of delay.  
When considering the different construction phases, few studies have focused on 
the engineering phase, which incorporates project planning and design (Yang, J.B. and 
Wei 2010). The author identified several engineering phase factors that presented 
themselves during the construction phase (Habibi et al. 2018b; Yang, J.B. and Wei 2010). 
Construction-related schedule delays were found to occur more frequently though and the 
ability to resolve them at this point is much more complicated and typically result in 
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disputes between parties (Assaf and Al-Hejji 2006; Prasad et al. 2018; Yang, J.B. and 
Wei 2010).  
Conclusions from the perceptions of the stakeholders varied significantly, as well. 
For example, the lack of project funding was the most significant cause of schedule 
delays, according to project managers in Denmark (Larsen et al. 2016a). Based on 
contractors' opinion, code-related delays appeared to be the single most significant cause 
of delay (Ahmed et al. 2003). Conversely, engineers in Norway concluded that poor 
planning and scheduling was ranked highest (Zidane and Andersen 2018). Comparing the 
ranking of causes of delay between the different stakeholders of projects within the same 
region, Assaf et al. (1995) concluded that there were consistently different results 
regarding the causes of delay. This is confirmed in the work of Faridi et al. (2006). They 
found that the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Lebanon, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA) shared only 30% of the identified causes of delay. Conversely, in Nigeria, Aibinu 
(2006) notes no statistical difference in ranking between 88% of all identified factors, 
which cause 90% of delay.  
The differing and sometimes conflicting results of surveys and questionnaires 
concerning the causes of delays further highlight the differences in perceptions between 
the parties and their ability to agree on matters affecting schedule delay, though. This 
could be the result of each parties’ “preconditioned responses” (Kumaraswamy and Chan 
1998). In other words, their opinions on the causes of delay are based on their 
experiences with the other parties and within their own. If, for instance, a respondent 
(contractor) has had consistently worse or more frequent unfavorable dealings with 
owners, they would be much more likely to respond that the owner is responsible for 
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delays or share those opinions within their organizations. It could also be the result of 
certain interdependencies between the causes of delay (Aibinu and Odeyinka 2006). 
These interdependencies within construction projects further intertwine and complicate 
the schedule and affect both concurrent and downstream activities (Aibinu and Odeyinka 
2006; Bankvall et al. 2010). Surveys and questionnaires are also susceptible to attrition or 
volunteer bias, leading to the introduction of systematic errors and subsequently affect 
the ability to apply the conclusions made to the larger population (Patten 2016). The 
issues identified above, therefore, necessitate the use of contractual, unbiased quantitative 
data. The information on the causes of schedule delay derived from surveys and 
questionnaires has proven useful in developing a deeper and more robust body of 
knowledge. 
Recent systematic literature reviews on schedule delay have guided researchers 
and planners alike by aggregating study findings. Ramanathan (2012) analyzed 41 
individual schedule delay studies, each consisting of unique questionnaires for 
construction professionals that identified 113 causes. The five most frequently cited 
causes of delay were associated with (1) the owner; (2) contractor; (3) design, plant, or 
equipment issues; (4) labor; and (5) consultant contractual or relationships. It was noted 
in the research, though, that after comparing the rankings between studies that the vastly 
different methods of calculating the weighted rankings, as well as the differing scopes 
covered by the studies, resulted in a lack of correlation between their respective rankings 
(i.e., no significant difference in the causes from the studies). Consequently, the research 
uses the top five causes of schedule delay from each study and concludes that the causes 
of schedule delay appear to be based on location, country, and project. 
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Zidane (2018) and Durdyev (2018) presented similarly ambiguous conclusions. 
Zidane identified 33 causes of delay from 105 worldwide projects, whereas Durdyev 
found 149 unique causes from 97. Zidane identified a mixture of both design and 
construction phase-related causes of delays. Durdyev’s findings were dominated by 
construction-related delays, illustrating the difference in causes and the timing that they 
can occur. Each of the papers offered unique insights on their findings regarding 
construction schedule delays. Lower GDP growth and per-capita earnings were correlated 
to the likelihood of the projects within a region to experience delays based on financial 
issues (e.g., lack of funding & delayed payments) (Zidane and Andersen 2018). Durdyev 
(2018) noted that most studies conducted in the USA focused on uncontrollable delays 
like weather, and those within developing nations focused on resource-related factors 
such as labor, materials, and finance. Despite these contributions, however, both papers 
noted that the literature shows that causes of delays differ from one country to another 
and that the causes were country- and project-specific (Durdyev and Hosseini 2018; 
Faridi and El-Sayegh 2006; Zidane and Andersen 2018). These studies have proven to be 
significant collections of research, and they can serve as the starting point for those 
seeking to identify the causes of schedule delay within their area of focus, possibly based 
on location or sector of construction using more definitive methods such as statistics, 
regression, and machine learning.   
Quantitative Research  
Quantitative studies that focus on the contractual outcomes, such as comparing 
contracted project duration and actual duration, can further narrow the possible causes of 
schedule delay. This can be accomplished using contract data and the results from 
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literature and surveys to identify potential investigation topics while avoiding some of the 
pitfalls associated with surveys (Ramanathan et al. 2012a), whose possibly biased results 
could be included in systematic reviews (Durdyev and Hosseini 2018; Habibi et al. 
2018b; Ramanathan et al. 2012a). Rowland (1981) analyzed the pre-construction contract 
information of 19 Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) projects to provide 
information on the factors that most influenced project performance. The data they 
considered included award amount, differences between government estimate and 
winning bidder, differences between all bids, and project complexity. The authors 
determined that the larger a project was, both in terms of cost and duration, the greater 
the likelihood that a change order would occur. Additionally, the greater the number of 
change orders, the greater the frequency and length of delays that occurred. Shrestha et 
al. (2013) reached similar conclusions in their analysis of 363 public works projects. The 
authors found that the magnitude of schedule delay increased as both the projects’ initial 
size and duration increased.  
Al-Momani (2000) reviewed the sources of delays during the construction phase 
of 130 publicly funded projects in Jordan. Through the use of this contractual information 
and linear regression, he was able to determine that design-related issues, change orders, 
weather, site conditions, and late delivery were the leading causes of delays. In a study of 
2,668 civil works projects conducted for the Indiana Department of Transportation 
(INDOT), Bordat et al. (2004) used ANOVA testing and discovered that the average 
delay per contract was 115 days. Through further regression analysis, it was also 
determined that the majority of the delays resulted from change orders that stemmed from 
issues within the purview of the owner (e.g., errors and omissions in design or quantities) 
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and are therefore within their capability to correct. Contract data used in these projects 
were able to identify the most frequent sources of delay in these cases. If, however, the 
use of contract information is not available, other data has proven useful in determining 
the delay sources. In a unique analysis using the judgments of 79 claims from previous 
construction projects, change orders, changes in scope, and delayed site handover were 
the three most prevalent causes of schedule delays (Yang et al. 2013). These findings 
continue to provide evidence that the causes of delays are specific not only to the location 
where they are being conducted but also to the type of construction and the parties 
involved.  
Additional research analyzed the performance of contracting methods, including 
design-build, design-bid-build, or Public-Private-Partnerships (P3) and procurement 
methods, such as the number of bidders, funding types, and project locations 
(Anastasopoulos et al. 2014; Maharjan and Shrestha 2018b; Zhang et al. 2019). Zhang et 
al. (Zhang et al. 2019) evaluated the performance of 66 projects greater than $10 million. 
The authors discovered that P3 projects experienced significantly less schedule delay 
than traditional contracting methods. In fact, the P3 projects finished ahead of schedule, 
on average. In a similar study comparing the performance of 100 water infrastructure 
projects based on contracting methods, Bogus et al. (2010) determined that design-build 
projects experienced less schedule delay than those of design-bid-build. There is also 
evidence that the opposite is true, at least concerning large highway infrastructure 
projects, in so far as design-build projects had more schedule delay compared to design-
bid-build (Shrestha et al. 2007).  
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Predicting Schedule Delay 
Several studies focus on predicting the risk of schedule delays in construction 
projects. By identifying the risk potential of a project, mitigation measures such as 
refining project scope (Dicks et al. 2017) or adding higher contingencies (Thal et al. 
2010) may reduce the severity of schedule delays. A recent study demonstrated that 
planners could use a project’s current performance to predict the anticipated magnitude of 
schedule delay. Rudeli et al. (2018) processed existing schedule performance from 105 
previous construction projects through a clustering analysis using the ongoing Earned 
Value Analysis (EVA). The authors used this method to predict final scheduling within 
4% of the actual duration. However, in using the EVA as an attribute for analysis, 
predictions on schedule performance could only be made during the project's duration, 
not before it started.  
Commonly identified sources associated with schedule delay found in literature, 
such as the owner, contractor, equipment, and external factors, were used in schedule 
performance research. By incorporating these factors, Yaseen et al. (2020) achieved a 
91.67% accuracy rating to predict the percentage increase in schedule delay using a 
hybrid Artificial Neural Network (ANN). The Random Forest – Genetic Algorithm used 
the results of questionnaires and a 40 project database to determine whether a project 
would experience schedule delays of <50%, 50-100%, or >100%. Son and Lee (2019) 
demonstrated the value of text mining critical terms from previous lessons learned 
Statements of Work (SOW) in predicting the amount of schedule delay risk for 
contractors in the construction of 13 offshore drilling projects. Unlike previous studies, 
however, the expected delay was on a continuous scale instead of preset bins. The result 
24 
was an accuracy of 81%; yet, it was only tested on one project. The ability of machine 
learning to parse through large amounts of data with limited supervision while potentially 
providing novel insights about the relationships between attributes associated with 
schedule delay makes it an ideal way to analyze construction contract data.  
Mitigating Schedule Delay 
In addition to identifying and predicting delays, some studies provide 
management or mitigation methods to reduce their frequency and severity on projects. 
Kumaraswamy and Chan (1998) investigated the ability of increased productivity to 
counteract the delays that plagued projects in Hong Kong. While the authors determined 
that productivity was effective at decreasing the required duration of labor in a given 
activity, the overall project duration was not reduced due to the inability to increase the 
productivity in other areas of the projects. The project's complexity and scale likely affect 
the ability to enhance productivity across all trades and tasks. Other mitigation efforts 
include implementing the Project Definition Rating Index (PRDI), a method of measuring 
and scoring the scope's completeness before the design stage. One recent study of 263 Air 
Force military construction projects found projects that used PDRI experience 7.8% 
fewer schedule delay (Dicks et al. 2017). Still, more studies focus on the use of 
experienced personnel (Abdul-Rahman et al. 2006), more detailed contract language 
(Yates and Epstein 2006), and even the use of weather derivatives (Brusset and Bertrand 
2018; Connors 2003) to either lessen or prevent the burdens of costs associated with 




The Way Forward 
While previous studies have contributed much to identifying the many causes of 
schedule delay, none have used a larger or more diverse data set to the author's 
knowledge. Containing more than 79,000 projects and spanning 277 types of 
construction, the data set used in this research could provide valuable insight into 
variations based on location, size, contract type, execution agent, and award time frame 
that research using less robust data sets could miss. Still, fewer studies have used 
machine learning techniques on such data sets to identify those causes. And while DoD 
specific studies on schedule delay exist, none have focused their efforts on analyzing real 
property repair, alterations, maintenance, and construction project contract data – 
together forming a significant portion of the DoD’s yearly budget. In doing so, 
commonly identified causal factors from literature could be used more effectively to 
mitigate the chances of future occurrences of delay by identifying contract attributes most 
commonly associated with poor schedule performance. In conjunction with current 
congressionally mandated policies, this effort could help further reduce the funding 
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Abstract 
Nearly one-half of all construction projects exceed planned costs and schedule, 
globally (Ramanathan et al. 2012a). Owners and construction managers can analyze 
historical project performance data to inform cost and schedule overrun risk-reduction 
strategies. Though, the majority of open-source project datasets are limited by the number 
of projects, data dimensionality, and location. A significant global customer of the 
construction industry, the Department of Defense (DoD) maintains a vast database of 
historical project data that can be used to determine the sources and magnitude of 
construction schedule and cost overruns for many continental and international locations. 
The selection of data provided by the authors is a subset of the U.S. Federal Procurement 
Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which stores contractual obligations made by 
the U.S. Federal Government (“Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation” 
n.d.). The data comprises more than ten fiscal years (1 Oct 2009 – 04 June 2020) of 
construction contract attributes that will enable researchers to investigate spatiotemporal 
schedule and cost performance by, but not limited to: contract type, construction type, 
delivery method, award date, and award value. To the knowledge of the authors, this is 
the most extensive open-source dataset of its kind, as it provides access to the contract 
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data of 132,662 uniquely identified construction projects totaling $865 billion. Because 
the DoD’s facilities and infrastructure construction requirements and use of private 
construction firms are congruent with the remainder of the public sector and the private 
sector, results obtained from analyses of this dataset may be appropriate for broader 
application.   
 
Keywords 
Construction, Cost, Schedule, Overrun, Delay, Growth, Data, Contract, Department of 
Defense 
Table 3-1 Description of Data 
Subject Engineering (General) 
Specific subject area The data within are 10-plus (9 additional months of 2020 contract 
data) fiscal years’ repair, alterations, maintenance, and construction 
project contract attributes, that represent an annual multi-billion-
dollar effort by the U.S. Federal Government to ensure the 
continued use and functionality of DoD facilities (also known as 
‘real property’). These data may be used to better predict costs and 
durations in nearly all sectors of construction for the U.S. Federal 
Government. Furthermore, the data could be used to provide 
quantifiable performance metrics on the ability of the DoD to 
execute various project types. 
Type of data Table 
How data were 
acquired 
Data were acquired through the Federal Procurement Data System - 
Next Generation (FPDS-NG or FPDS). The FPDS-NG offers public 
users access to the spending patterns of the Federal government. The 
FPDS houses all contract actions of the Federal Government, 
beyond construction. Filters were applied to limit the results to just 
construction projects funded by the DoD.  
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Data format Raw 
 
Parameters for data 
collection 
Access FPDS-NG website and create an ad hoc report filtering the 
contract data by: 
1. Date Signed  
2. Contracting Department Name   
3. Product Service or Code 
Description of data 
collection (600 max 
characters) 
Government agencies are responsible for collecting and reporting 
data on federal procurements through the Federal Procurement Data 
System–Next Generation (FPDS-NG). Contracting Officers (COs) 
must submit complete reports on all contract actions, as required by 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (“Federal Procurement 
Data System | GSA” n.d.). 
 
Any contract with an estimated value greater than $10,000 must be 
reported using FPDS-NG (“FPDS-NG FAQ” n.d.). 
 
FPDS-NG is the sole location for all contractual and procurement 
obligations made by the U.S. Federal Government.  
Data source location Institution: Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation 
(FPDS-NG)  
Data accessibility Repository name: Mendeley Data 
Data identification number: DOI: 10.17632/yk4s7pdsvk.1 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/yk4s7pdsvk.1 
Direct URL to data: 
https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/yk4s7pdsvk/1 
 
Value of the Data 
• These data contain 132,662 construction projects, spanning 10-plus years, and 
account for $856 billion in DoD spending. These data are categorically diverse; 
they contain many types of projects, including but not limited to, roads, runways, 
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administrative facilities, communications work, mechanical renovation, and 
demolition.  
• Statistical analyses may be performed by researchers participating in construction 
auditing, cost estimating, planning, or programming. 
• These data may identify trends and relationships in construction contract 
information at and between geographic locations, construction sectors, contract 
types, contracting agents, project costs, project durations, and modification 
frequency.  
• Current literature focuses on a comparatively small sample size when empirically 
analyzing construction contract data. To the author’s knowledge, this is the most 
extensive set of construction contract data from a single source.  
• These data can also be used to track historical spending on construction projects 
within the U.S. DoD. These data could prove useful in creating forecasting 
models on construction cost fluctuations or even be used to calibrate project costs 
and schedules based on their type. 
Data Description 
The data were compiled from the FPDS-NG website using specific querying to 
obtain all real property repair, alterations, maintenance, and construction projects 
executed by the U.S. DoD from 2009 to 2020. These data represent 132,652 construction 
projects for which the U.S. DoD contracted outside entities to complete necessary 
maintenance, repairs, alterations, and modernization of U.S. DoD real property.  
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These U.S. DoD construction projects range from hangar and runway repairs to 
modernization projects for office space. Many of the projects completed on U.S. DoD 
installations can also be found in the public or private sectors of the construction 
industry. 
Funding of U.S. DoD construction projects varies from year to year, much like 
other public and private entities. This variability in funding is based on factors outside of 
the control of the U.S. DoD and, therefore, requires these expenditures to be on-target 
with regard to planned cost and schedule. The effects of deviation from these planned 
attributes, for any project, can be far-reaching.  Projects exceeding planned cost and 
schedule can result in deferred or cancelled facility maintenance, repair or construction 
initiatives elsewhere in the DoD’s portfolio, both in the current and future years. To 
ensure the capability and mission readiness of the U.S. DoD (of which the U.S. military 
is a part), the facilities it operates must be maintained to meet the users’ needs.  
To mitigate these deferments, possible project cancellations, and in order to meet 
the needs of the facility occupants, these data can be used to identify key factors 
associated with cost and schedule deviations. Once isolated, these factors can be used to 
mitigate future cost or schedule overruns associated with public and private construction, 
as well as U.S. DoD construction projects. 
Experimental Design, Material, and Methods 
As mentioned previously, the data were pulled from FPDS-NG using several progressive 
filters. The filters used are listed below: 
1. “Contracting Department Name” showing only “DEPT OF DEFENSE” 
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2. “Product Service Code” similar to “Y1” for “Construction of Structures and 
Facilities” 
3. “Product Service Code” similar to “Z1” for “Maintenance of Real Property” 
4. “Product Service Code” similar to “Z2” for “Repair of Alterations of Real 
Property”  
5. “Date Signed only show values between” with dates “10/01/XXXX” and 
09/31/XXXX” based on the fiscal year (e.g., 10/01/2017 and 09/31/2018 for fiscal 
year 2018) 
6. “Treasury Account Symbol Main Account Code” showing only “3400”, “3300”, 
“3307”, “3404”, “1205”, “1206”, “1804”, “1805”, “1106”, “1107”, “2020”, 
“2022”, “2050”, “2051”, “3122”, “3123”,”'3134”, “3135.” 
7. Each Product Service Code was used for every fiscal year while keeping the 
Contracting Department Name consistently limited to the Department of Defense. 
In doing so, at least three spreadsheets were produced for each fiscal year from 
2009 through the first 6 months 2020. The database output was limited to CSV 
files containing 30,000 or fewer lines that, in some cases, necessitated the 
production of additional files based on a given PCS and fiscal year. 
A complete description of each of the elements contained in the data are listed below and 
unless otherwise noted found in the FPDS-NG User’s Manual (“GSA Federal 






Table 3-2 Description of Attributes in the Dataset 
Attribute Name Attribute Description 
Contracting Agency 
ID 
The code for the agency of the contracting office that executed or is 
otherwise responsible for the transaction 
Contracting Agency 
Name 
Specific branch within the DoD requesting contract action** 




The agency-supplied name of the contracting office that executes the 
transaction. 
Country Where 
Award was Issued 
Location of execution agent** 
Major Command 
Name 
Major Command of DoD requesting contracting action 
Modification Number An identifier issued by an agency that uniquely identifies one 




The unique identifier for each contract, agreement, or order. In other 
words, the individual delivery or task orders (projects) 
Referenced IDV PIID When reporting orders under Indefinite Delivery Vehicles (IDV) such 
as a Governmentwide Acquisition Contract (GWAC), Indefinite 
Delivery Contract (IDC), Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), Basic 
Order Agreement (BOA), or Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA), 
report the Procurement Instrument Identifier (Contract Number or 
Agreement Number) of the IDV. For the initial load of a BPA under 
an FSS, this is the FSS contract number. Note: BOAs and BPAs are 
with industry and not with other Federal Agencies. In other words, the 
parent contract ID of an IDV issued that can have multiple delivery or 
task orders (PIID) obligated against it. 
Referenced IDV Mod 
Number 
When reporting orders under Indefinite Delivery Vehicles (IDV) such 
as a GWAC, IDC, FSS, BOA, or BPA, report the Modification 
Number along with Procurement Instrument Identifier (Contract 
Number or Agreement Number) of the IDV. For the initial load of a 
BPA under an FSS, this is the FSS contract number. Note: BOAs and 
BPAs are with industry and not with other Federal Agencies 
Transaction Number Tie Breaker for legal, unique transactions that would otherwise have 
the same key 
Date Signed The date that a mutually binding agreement was reached. The date 
signed by the Contracting Officer or the Contractor, whichever is 
later. 
Effective Date The date that the parties agree will be the starting date for the 
contract's requirements. The Effective Date cannot be earlier than the 
Signed Date on the base document. 
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Completion Date The [current] completion date of the base contract plus options that 
have been exercised 
Est. Ultimate 
Completion Date 
The estimated or scheduled completion date, including the base 
contract or order, and all options (if any), whether the options have 
been exercised or not 
Fiscal Year The fiscal year of action as determined by 'Date Signed' 
Funding Agency ID The agency ID that has provided the preponderance of funding 
Funding Agency 
Name 
The agency name that has provided the preponderance of funding 
(e.g, Dept of the Navy) 
Funding Department 
ID 




The Department or Independent Agency name to which the 'Funding 
Agency' belongs (e.g., DoD) 
Funding Office ID The code provided by the funding agency that identifies the office or 
other organizational entity that provided the funds for this transaction. 
If the Funding Agency is DoD, the code must be valid in the DoD 
Activity Address Code (DODAAC) table. This is a required field 
when DoD has funded the action. 
Funding Office Name The funding office is the office within the federal agency that is 
providing the funding for the contract 
(Type of IDC) Identifies whether the IDC or Multi-Agency Contract is Indefinite 
Delivery/Requirements, Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity, or 
Indefinite Delivery/Definite Quantity. A requirements contract 
provides for filling all actual purchase requirements of designated 
Government activities for supplies or services during a specified 
contract period, with deliveries or performance to be scheduled by 
placing orders with the contractor. A Requirements IDC or Multi-
Agency Contract is a contract for all of the agency's requirement for 
the supplies or services specified, and effective for the period stated, 
in the IDC or Multi-Agency Contract. 
Multiple or Single 
Award IDV 
Indicates whether the contract is one of many that resulted from a 
single solicitation, all of the contracts are for the same or similar 
items, and contracting officers are required to compare their 
requirements with the offerings under more than one contract or are 





A multi-year contract means a contract for the purchase of supplies or 
services for more than one, but not more than five, program years. 
Such contracts are issued under specific congressional authority for 
specific programs. A multi-year contract may provide that 
performance under the contract during the second and subsequent 
years of the contract is contingent upon the appropriation of funds, 
and (if it does so provide) may provide for a cancellation payment to 
be made to the contractor if appropriations are not made. The key 
distinguishing difference between multi-year contracts and multiple 
year contracts is that multi-year contracts buy more than one year of 
requirement (of a product or service) without establishing and having 
to exercise an option for each program year after the first 
Type of Contract The type of contract, as defined in FAR Part 16 that applies to this 
procurement. The following apply to all Awards and IDVs: 
A - Fixed Price Redetermination 
B - Fixed Price Level of Effort 
J - Firm Fixed Price 
K - Fixed Price with Economic Price Adjustment 
L - Fixed Price Incentive 
M - Fixed Price Award Fee 
R - Cost Plus Award Fee 
S - Cost No Fee 
T - Cost Sharing 
U - Cost Plus Fixed Fee 
V - Cost Plus Incentive Fee 
Y - Time and Materials 
Z - Labor Hours 
The following apply to IDVs only: 
1 - Order Dependent (IDV allows pricing arrangement to be 
determined separately for each order) 
The following apply to Awards only: 
2 - Combination (Applies to Awards where two or more of the above 
apply) 
3 - Other (Applies to Awards where none of the above apply) 
NAICS Code The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes 
designate major sectors of the economies of Mexico, Canada, and the 
United States 
NAICS Description Field providing further information on the description of work in 
reference to the 'NAICS Code' 
Principal Place of 
Performance State 
Code 
This is the location of the principal plant or place of business where 
the items will be produced, supplied from stock, or where the service 
will be performed. 
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Principal Place of 
Performance City 
Name 
This is the location of the principal plant or place of business where 
the items will be produced, supplied from stock, or where the service 
will be performed. 
Principal Place of 
Performance Country 
Name 
This is the location of the principal plant or place of business where 
the items will be produced, supplied from stock, or where the service 
will be performed. 
Place of Performance 
Zip Code 
This is the location of the principal plant or place of business where 
the items will be produced, supplied from stock, or where the service 
will be performed. 
Product or Service 
Description 
A description of the product or service designated by the product code 
Product or Service 
Code 




A brief description of the contract or award 
Award or IDV Type Types of awards: 
- Delivery /Task Order Against IDV 
- Purchase Order 
- Definitive Contract 
- BPA Call 
- Other Transaction Order* 
- Other Transaction Agreement* 
  
Types of IDVs(Indefinite Delivery Vehicles): 
- Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) 
- Governmentwide Acquisition Contract (GWAC) 
- Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) 
- Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) 
- Indefinite Delivery Contracts (IDC) 
- Other Transaction IDV* 




Reason for modification (change order) which may or may not be 
applicable: 
A - Additional Work (new agreement, FAR part 6 applies) 
B - Supplemental Agreement for work within scope 
C - Funding Only Action 
D - Change Order 
E - Terminate for Default (complete or partial) 
F - Terminate for Convenience (complete or partial) 
G - Exercise an Option 
H - Definitize Letter Contract 
J - Novation Agreement 
36 
K - Close Out 
L - Definitize Change Order 
M - Other Administrative Action   
IDV Type The type of Indefinite Delivery Vehicle being (IDV) loaded by this 
transaction. IDV Types include Government-Wide Acquisition 
Contract (GWAC), Multi-Agency Contract, Other Indefinite Delivery 
Contract (IDC), Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), Basic Ordering 
Agreement (BOA), and Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA) 
Extent Competed A code that represents the competitive nature of the contract: 
A - Full and Open Competition 
B - Not Available for Competition 
C - Not Competed 
D - Full and Open Competition after exclusion of sources 
E - Follow On to Competed Action 
F - Competed under Simplified Acquisitions Program (SAP) 
G - Not Competed under SAP 
CDO - Competitive Delivery Order 
NDO - Non-Competitive Delivery Order  
Number of Offers 
Received 





Agency Identifier represents the department, agency, or establishment 





The U.S. Federal Agency account code for the agency supplying the 
preponderance of funding as assigned by the U.S. Treasury ** 
Treasury Account 
Symbol Sub Account 
Code 
Identifies a Treasury-defined sub-division of the main account** 
IDV NAICS Code The NAICS Code of the parent IDV contract** 
IDV NAICS 
Description 
The NAICS Description of the parent IDV contract** 
IDV Contracting 
Agency ID   
The code for the agency of the contracting office that executed the 
parent IDV contract** 
IDV Contracting 
Agency Name 
The name of the entity responsible for the initial parent IDV contract 
action** 




The department name of the entity responsible for the initial parent 
IDV contract action. Typically the U.S. DoD or GSA** 
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IDV Major Program 
Code 
This field is not required, but you may enter it on all IDVs except for 
an FSS. This is the agency-determined code for a major program 
within the agency. For an Indefinite Delivery Vehicle, this may be the 
name of a GWAC (such as ITOPS or COMMITS). 
IDV Referenced IDV 
Agency Code 
The agency code that initially input the parent IDV contract** 
IDV Referenced IDV 
PIID 
The Contract Number of the IDV against which the order is placed 
IDV Subcontract Plan This data element is required for a DCA, Purchase Order, Delivery 
Order against a BOA, and Part 13 BPA Call. A Delivery Order 
against FSS, GWAC, and IDC will be propagated. Part 8 BPA Call is 
Not Applicable. This field indicates whether the contract award 
required a Subcontracting Plan. This field is also used to provide 
information to the Electronic Subcontracting Reporting System 
(eSRS) on awards that have subcontracting plans. Failure to complete 
this field accurately impacts vendors’ ability to report subcontracting 
achievement to the eSRS. Select the appropriate value from the drop-
down menu. See Data Dictionary Element 11B Use Case for 
appropriate data entry requirements. 
  
A - Plan Not Included - No Subcontracting Possibilities 
B - Plan Not Required 
C - Plan Required - Incentive Not Included 
D - Plan Required - Incentive Included 
E - Plan Required (Pre 2004) 
F - Individual Subcontract Plan 
G - Commercial Subcontract Plan 
H - DoD Comprehensive Subcontract Plan  
IDV Subcontract Plan 
Description 
A description of the subcontract plan work performed under the 
parent IDV contract** 
IDV Type of IDC This data element is required on an IDC and Populates to the 
Modification. It is Not Applicable for all other IDVs. This field 
identifies whether the IDC or Multi-Agency Contract is Indefinite 
Delivery/Requirements, Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity, or 
Indefinite Delivery/Definite Quantity (FAR 16.5). An entry is 
required for civilian agency and DoD IDCs. Values are listed below: 
  
A - Indefinite Delivery / Requirements 
B - Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity 
C - Indefinite Delivery / Definite Quantity 
IDV Type of IDC 
Description 
The type of Indefinite Delivery Contract Descriptions of the parent 
IDV contract** 
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IDV Who Can Use This data element is required on all IDVs and is Not Applicable for 
Modifications. This field designates agencies that may place orders 
against this indefinite delivery vehicle. For the initial award of an 
IDV, select one of the following: 
− Only My Agency – Only the agency awarding the contract may 
place orders. 
− All Agencies – All Federal Government agencies may place orders 
against the contract. 
− Defense – Only Department of Defense agencies may place orders 
against the contract. 
− Civilian – Only civilian agencies may place orders against the 
contract. 
− Other – Provide a text statement of which agencies may place 
orders against the contract. 
IDV Who Can Use 
Description 
The description of the Who Can Use field: 
– Only the agency awarding the contract may place orders. 
– All Federal Government agencies may place orders against the 
contract. 
– Only Department of Defense agencies may place orders against the 
contract. 
– Only civilian agencies may place orders against the contract. 
– Provide a text statement of which agencies may place orders against 
the contract. 
Base and Exercised 
Options Value 
The contract value for the base contract and any options that have 
been exercised 
Action Obligation The amount that is obligated or de-obligated by this transaction 
Base and All Options 
Value (Total Contract 
Value) 
Required for all Awards and Modifications except for a BPA Call. It 
is not required for a Change or Delete/Void. It is the mutually agreed 
upon total contract or order value including all options (if any). For 
modifications, this is the change (positive or negative, if any) in the 
mutually agreed upon total contract value. 
** Indicates that the attribute definition was not provided by the FPDS-NG user's manual or 
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Abstract 
Cost and schedule overrun impact over 50% of all construction projects and create 
various cascading effects. Overrun diminish funding for concurrent projects, deplete 
operational budgets, causing deferred infrastructure maintenance, and impair future 
project award ability. Though existing research identifies sources of overrun, models are 
overfitting or too narrowly focused for broad application. This research analyzes 79,894 
US Department of Defense (DoD) projects and uses stepwise logistic regression to 
determine which of 62 contract attributes are most skillful in determining, categorically, 
whether a project will experience cost or schedule overrun. A second, random forest 
categorization framework is used to determine the magnitude of project overruns. The 
most skillful models explain 65% of cost and 75% of schedule overrun. This research is 
expected to support public and private sector planners in the cost-efficient execution of 
construction projects and aid in reducing the DoD’s $116 billion project backlog. 
Keywords 
Cost overrun, Schedule Delay, Construction, Contract Data, Department of Defense  
40 
Introduction 
More than half of all construction projects exceed their target budget or schedule 
(Assaf and Al-Hejji 2006; Habibi and Kermanshachi 2018; Ramanathan et al. 2012b) 
Publicly funded projects are no exception (Bordat et al. 2004; Shane et al. 2009). Among 
their many consequences, cost and schedule overrun’s impact on funding for future 
construction is especially severe. Public organizations like the United States Federal 
Government, state, and local municipalities must adhere to their approved budgets to 
remain fiscally accountable and financially solvent. However, the need for infrastructure 
construction, repair, and modernization often exceeds those budgets. In these cases, 
prioritization and, often, deferment are the only available solutions (ASCE 2016). 
Consequently, overruns can further postpone much-needed work. 
Despite significant spending on infrastructure and facilities by local, state, and 
federal governments, the backlog of projects continues to rise. Currently, it represents an 
unfunded gap of $2.1 trillion within the US alone (Deloitte 2009). This backlog of 
transportation, utility, environment, and facilities projects (Deloitte 2017; Oberhelman 
2015) comes at the cost of continuously deteriorating infrastructure with a high risk of 
failure (ASCE 2016). Research indicates that infrastructure’s health is directly related to 
the economy’s performance and quality of life for citizens (Clarke 2014; Fischer and 
Amekudzi 2011). Given the rigidity of the budget and the urgency of the need for 
infrastructure improvements, mitigation of cost and schedule overrun is essential. Though 
construction technology and management practices continue to be revised and improved 
based on past experiences, cost and schedule overrun persist (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; 
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Katseff et al. 2020). Therefore, avoiding those common sources of cost and schedule 
overrun is a critical yet tangible means to execute projects more effectively. 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) provides an excellent case study, as it 
executes a large construction budget and holds a $116B backlog in construction 
requirements (Cronk 2018). This backlog results in a lack of mission-essential readiness, 
missed requirements, lower morale, and reduced effectiveness (Knopman et al. 2017; 
Roulo 2015). DoD projects are not immune from overrun, with more than 48% of 
projects sampled experiencing it, exacerbating the backlog. Furthermore, cost and 
schedule overrun on construction projects can drive borrowing from fixed operations and 
maintenance budgets (Congressional Research Service 2019), which is already 
underfunded (Serbu 2019; USGAO United States Goverment Accountability Office 
2019). 
The sources of overrun in the construction industry have been studied for at least 
35 years (Durdyev and Hosseini 2018). However, overrun sources vary from region-to-
region, owner-to-owner, and project-to-project. One previous study shows that the only 
underlying reason for overruns is design change (Chang 2002), while another found 73 
different causes identifying incorrect award duration as the most significant contributor to 
overrun (Assaf et al. 1995). Literature surrounding overruns is discussed more fully in the 
next section. Previous studies that analyzed construction performance using contract 
attributes have garnered significant insights into the factors that greatly affect 
performance (Al-Momani 2000; Bordat et al. 2004; Rowland 1981; Zhang et al. 2019), 
but are limited in terms of scope, projects evaluated, or spatiotemporal variety. 
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This research presents the most extensive investigation of construction contract 
data on record, to the authors’ knowledge. 79,894 DoD construction projects spanning 
ten years are analyzed to determine the primary causes of project cost and schedule 
overrun. The size of this data set also increases the meaningfulness of the statistical 
relationships found. Additionally, a two-stage statistical approach for determining both 
the likelihood and magnitude of cost and schedule overruns are explored. First, a 
stepwise logistic regression model is employed to predict the likelihood that a project will 
experience overrun. Then, a Random Forest Classification (RFC) algorithm is applied to 
determine the extent to which a project will experience overrun. These efforts will enable 
project managers and planners to implement mitigation techniques and methods to curb 
overrun’s effects based on their own risk tolerance. While this analysis uses DoD’s 
construction portfolio’s past performance based on contract data, which could directly 
help the DoD mitigate overruns (Darren et al. 2009; Dicks et al. 2017; Rosner et al. 
2009), the similarities between public and private projects suggest that the results are 
likely more-broadly applicable. 
Background/Literature Review 
The causal factors associated with cost and schedule overrun varied significantly 
between previous studies based on the size and composition of projects contained in their 
datasets. Consequently, there exists a myriad of different causes correlated with overrun, 
which, according to the same research, tended to be project-, location-, or owner-specific. 
The literature investigating overruns can generally be categorized into two groups based 
on the methods employed to determine its cause: (1) qualitative research, including 
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surveys and group decision making; and (2) quantitative research, including descriptive 
statistics and modeling. 
Qualitative Research - Cost Overrun 
Surveys of experts with firsthand knowledge of construction projects have proven 
useful in identifying causes of overrun such as construction project characteristics, 
including project size and type (Islam et al. 2019b), design issues (Polat et al. 2014), and 
scope changes (Kaliba et al. 2009). This method has also been used to identify exogenous 
factors leading to cost overrun, including weather (Kaliba et al. 2009) and optimism bias 
and political deceit, e.g., pressing for projects for personal gain (Cantarelli et al. 2010, 
2012). Research studies using surveys tend to have a project-, region-, or respondent-
specific focus on overruns, limiting how they can generalize to all projects. Furthermore, 
this method can introduce unintended biases in the results, such as party-specific 
perceptions (Kumaraswamy and Chan 1995) or volunteerism (Patten 2016). However, 
surveys have been used to identify generic root causes for overrun, which are applicable 
to all projects (Rosenfeld 2014). 
Quantitative Research - Cost Overrun 
While qualitative analysis techniques are broadly focused and can identify factors 
related to cost overrun, quantitative analysis techniques identify specific relationships and 
their strengths using construction project data. Construction contract data has been used 
to show how team cordiality (Dada 2014), the use of lowest bid price (Woo et al. 2017), 
and contract type (Anastasopoulos et al. 2014) affect project performance. Similar to 
research using surveys, these types of studies also tend to use contract data from projects 
that are of a specific kind (Alleman et al. 2020; Anastasopoulos et al. 2014; Kuprenas and 
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Nasr 2003; Turcotte 1996), location (Kuprenas and Nasr 2003; Turcotte 1996) or similar 
execution method (Kuprenas and Nasr 2003). In a broader study of project types, Love et 
al. (2013) reviewed 276 different projects spanning all of Australia, ultimately 
concluding that neither project size nor type had any significant impact on cost overrun. 
In previous research, Love et al. (2002) found that the procurement method did not affect 
overrun either. The findings from these types of work have proven invaluable in 
expanding the body of knowledge from which more in-depth analysis is performed. 
The use of contract data has also enabled researchers to identify the degree to 
which project attributes explain variability in project performance and measure the 
expected magnitude of cost overrun. Statistical regression-based models are most 
commonly used to establish the aforementioned relationships and create forecast models 
(Creedy et al. 2010; Gkritza and Labi 2008; Odeck 2004b; Thal et al. 2010). In research 
conducted by Thal et al. (2010), there is an apparent implication that cost overruns are an 
inevitable part of construction and, as such, focused their efforts on the ability to 
accurately account for contingencies as a means to prevent unforeseen spending. Again, 
noting the uncertainty associated with construction projects, Touran and Lopez (2006), 
asserted that escalation, including inflation, taxes, market conditions, and interest rate, 
should be accounted for as it is a significant overrun source in projects with multi-year 
durations. However, other research attempts to identify the causes of overrun to help 
mitigate cost overruns on future projects instead of merely accounting for them. Odeck 
(2004), found that of 620 Norwegian roadway projects, lower cost projects experienced 
10.62% more cost overrun than larger projects, which, on average, ended up coming in 
below budget.  
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Further confirming these results, Creedy et al. (2010) found that for 231 
Queensland, Australia highway projects, the amount of overrun incurred reduced as the 
project cost increased. They also noted that the work’s geographic location did not impact 
overrun costs. The differential in cost between the owner’s estimate and bid price has 
also proved useful in modeling cost overruns. In a study of 1,576 navy projects, Jahren 
and Ashe (1991) found that as the difference between the estimate and bid increased, so 
did overruns. Contract schedule information has also proved useful, as demonstrated by 
Gkritza and Labi (2008). As the programmed duration increased, so did the likelihood 
and magnitude of cost overruns within 1,957 Indiana highway projects. They also found 
that a project’s complexity and initial cost were positively correlated with increased 
overrun. In general, modeling efforts have revealed that significant insights into cost 
overruns can be gained by analyzing contract attributes. By using these results to modify 
future project execution strategies, overruns can be mitigated. There is, however, an 
apparent lack of agreement in research as to which attributes of a project are indicators of 
overrun, which could be attributed to a lack of scale or diversity in datasets used.  
Qualitative Research - Schedule Overrun 
Schedule overruns are frequently the source of increased and unforeseen costs 
associated with additional overhead incurred on a project (Assaf and Al-Hejji 2006; 
Rowland 1981; Semple et al. 1994b). Accordingly, researchers have utilized surveys to 
identify the causes of schedule overruns. Causes include unforeseen site conditions 
(Kumaraswamy and Chan 1998), code issues (Ahmed et al. 2003), owner changes (Assaf 
and Al-Hejji 2006; Marzouk et al. 2008; Yang, J.B. and Wei 2010), and financial 
difficulties (Aibinu and Odeyinka 2006; Assaf et al. 1995; Frimpong et al. 2003; Larsen 
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et al. 2016b; Prasad et al. 2018). Much like that of cost overrun, these studies are 
frequently project-, region-, or respondent-specific, limiting their capability for broader 
application across the industry. However, literature reviews of schedule overruns have 
synthesized hundreds of papers in attempts to provide universally applicable overruns, 
which provide valuable information and ideas on where industry can start their mitigation 
efforts (Durdyev and Hosseini 2018; Habibi et al. 2018b; Zidane and Andersen 2018). 
Quantitative Research - Schedule Overrun 
Quantitative studies that focus on the contractual outcomes, such as comparing 
contracted project duration and actual duration, can further narrow the possible causes of 
schedule overrun. Research using these methods has identified several factors, including 
delivery method (Bogus et al. 2010; Cheng 2014; Zhang et al. 2019), initial cost 
(Rowland 1981), initial duration (Maharjan and Shrestha 2018a), and contract type 
(Cheng 2014). A study on 100 different water infrastructure projects determined that the 
magnitude of schedule overrun was affected by choice of delivery methods and payment 
structures (Bogus et al. 2010). Similarly, Zhang (2019) found that the Public-Private-
Partnership delivery method reduced overruns by four months on average in Western 
Canada. In research conducted by Rowland (1981), schedule overrun increased as the 
difference between the programmed cost and awarded cost increased and when the 
difference between high and low bidders increased. However, Rowland also determined 
that projects would experience a more significant overrun if the bids were very close 
together, which is likely due to a small sample of only 20 projects. A larger initial or 
programmed duration is also shown to increase schedule overrun (Maharjan and Shrestha 
2018a). In a study that uses both public and private projects, Chen et al. (2016) concluded 
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that contract type and owner were affected by the amount of overrun. The statistical 
methods used here equips owners with additional information that may be used to 
mitigate schedule overrun further or be analyzed further to estimate the likelihood or 
magnitude of overrun. 
Statistical regression is commonly used to estimate the expected amount of 
project schedule overrun. Al-Momani was able to estimate the duration of various 
projects using linear regression, explaining more than 60% of the variation in time using 
only the programmed duration, but noted that additional factors like contractor 
performance could influence the number of overruns experienced. Bordat et al. (2004) 
found that schedule overrun among 2,668 INDOT projects was significantly correlated 
with project type (e.g., bridge, resurfacing, maintenance), the proportion of inclement 
weather days, programmed duration, and project cost. The importance of the information 
contained within the database was also evidenced by the ability to assign responsibility 
for most overruns to the owner (Bordat et al. 2004). Using multiple linear regression, 
Maharjan (2018) found that among 129 Texas Department of Transportation projects, the 
number of bidders and difference between the award and estimated costs were 
statistically significant. As the number of bidders and difference increased, so did the 
estimated schedule overrun (Maharjan and Shrestha 2018a). In a study on the 
interdependencies of cost and schedule overrun, Bhargava et al. (Bhargava et al. 2010) 
found that, for all but one type of project, as programmed duration increased, the estimate 
for schedule overrun decreased. The study concludes that the number of attributes 
accounts for only 40% of the variation and is thus not comprehensive. It can be 
summarized that the insight provided by contract data through regression has been 
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significant, albeit primarily focused on a specific type of project within a relatively small 
geographic area. 
Despite these studies’ significant contributions, few have focused on predicting a 
project’s likelihood to experience cost or schedule overrun using attributes from contract 
data. Even fewer studies have used DoD projects as the basis for analysis despite the 
similarities between them and the industry as a whole. The scale and diversity of data 
used in this study also solve another of the limitations highlighted above by providing an 
unprecedented look at contract information and performance from a construction 
portfolio that spans hundreds of project types, more than ten years, and a large 
geographic area. Therefore, this study should produce more definitive and broadly 
applicable results. 
Data Characterization 
The data used in this study was obtained from Stout et al. (2020) that spans 
132,662 DoD construction projects with 62 contract attributes per-project, covering over 
10 fiscal years, and accounting for over $856 billion in funding. A subset of this data was 
used to study factors associated with cost and schedule overrun. For this research, cost 
and schedule overrun are defined as any positive deviation, as a percentage, from the 
original programmed or award amount. These overruns are calculated using Equations (1) 
and (2): 
 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛	 = /01234	56789:;3<=	5678
:;3<=	5678
> × 100%  
 
(1) 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒	𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛 = G
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑	𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛




As overruns are calculated by the percent change from the award value, projects 
with an award cost of $0 or duration of 0 days were removed, as a percent change in 
cost/schedule cannot be executed with a zero value. Moreover, according to Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR), which police government procurement, projects cannot 
be awarded with either of these conditions and are therefore considered erroneous. The 
remaining dataset, which was the subset used for analysis, contains 79,894 projects. 
Additionally, attributes that uniquely identified a project or any of its characteristics were 
removed as these would not add value to the analysis given the methods used. Finally, 
where redundancy among attributes existed (e.g., contracting agent name v. contracting 
agent office), all but a single instance was removed. This work resulted in the retention of 
36 attributes. 
The final dataset contains construction, maintenance, restoration, and 
modernization projects across the DoD to include the military branches: Air Force (AF), 
Army, and Navy, which also includes the Marine Corps. Each branch has unique policies, 
regulations, structures, and missions, and to investigate whether overruns are subject to 
institutional differences, each branch was subset. Table 4-1 below provides a breakdown 
of data in each of these subsets, including the historical cost and schedule overrun 
occurrences (i.e., the percentage of projects that experienced overrun). 
Table 4-1 Data breakdown by military branch subset: Number of projects, historical cost 
overrun occurrence, and historical schedule overrun occurrence. 
	 Total	 Air	Force	 Army	 Navy	
Projects	 79,894	 21,554	 29,541	 23,966	
Cost	Overrun	 43.49%	 50.00%	 47.40%	 29.27%	
Schedule	Overrun	 35.13%	 43.40%	 36.99%	 24.31%	
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There are many ways to visualize and characterize this dataset due to its breadth 
and depth. Accordingly, this section explores various breakdowns of the data to enrich 
the understanding of patterns and trends. A project may be awarded any month within the 
fiscal year, though as Figure 4-1 visualizes, over 38% of projects are awarded in 
September, the last month of the fiscal year. Furthermore, this figure shows that as the 
fiscal year progresses, more projects are awarded each month. This spending pattern 
likely comes as a direct result of DoD financial policy (i.e., use or lose), in which the 
funds set for the fiscal year must be spent prior to its end or risk losing the remaining 
funds next year. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Number of DoD construction projects awarded by month from fiscal year 
2010 through fiscal year 2020. 
Building on the breakdown by award month, Figure 4-2 visualizes the trends of 


































experiencing the highest rates.  Though, it is worth noting cost overrun always exceeds 
schedule overrun.   
 
Figure 4-2 Historical trend of cost and schedule overrun occurrence by project award 
month. 
Cost overrun rate by award duration (i.e., project length) is another way to inspect 
data trends. Figure 4-3 visually summarizes the cost overrun rate for projects with an 
award duration of less than one month through projects programmed as longer than a 
year. Historically, as the duration increases, the percent of projects that experience cost 
overrun also increases. This result is expected because longer projects are typically more 
complex, and those exposed to environmental factors (e.g., precipitation and temperature) 

























Figure 4-3 Historical trend of cost overrun occurrence by project award duration. The 
number of projects awarded by month and overrun category is also annotated by the 
number within each column. 
Methodology 
While many studies use surveys (Assaf and Al-Hejji 2006; Ramanathan et al. 
2012a; Yehiel 2013) and statistical analysis such as ANOVA (Love et al. 2013; Senouci 
et al. 2016; Thal et al. 2010) and multiple linear regression (El-Maaty et al. 2017; Jahren 
1991; Maharjan and Shrestha 2018a) to identify contract/project attributes correlated with 
overrun, this research uses logistic regression and RFC to help predict the likelihood and 
magnitude of overruns, respectively, while also identifying significant attributes. While 
the intended application is running both processes in series, feeding projects classified as 
experiencing overrun from the likelihood model into the RFC to obtain a magnitude 


























































































































































without introducing additional noise. This two-fold ideological approach to analysis 
explores a novel application of both methods.  
Figure 4-4 depicts the process of data entering each model and outputting results. 
It is to note, a 70:30 split is used to train the models on a random 70% of data and to test 
the models on the remaining 30%. This is a common practice in data analytics (Coleman 
et al. 2020; Liu and Cocea 2017; Yang 2020). The resulting methodology is intended to 
be applicable for any construction entity; however, this research and resulting models 
have been tailored to the DoD and each military branch. 
 
Figure 4-4 Ideological methodical approach. Two main methods were utilized: 1) 
Logistic Regression to determine cost and/or schedule overrun likelihood and 2) Random 
Forest Classification to determine magnitude of overrun. 
Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression is like multiple linear regression in that multiple variables are 
combined to predict some dependent outcome; however, in logistic regression, the 
dependent outcome is binary. Logistic regression has been extensively used in medical 
research for more than 20 years because of the dichotomous nature of the outcome (i.e., 
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Yes/No) and its robustness regarding deviation from normality, with prediction 
applications varying from diagnosis to reaction susceptibility (Bender and Grouven 
1997). More recently, it has also been successfully applied within construction research 
to determine influential factors in project cost (Lu et al. 2017), project management 
factors affecting delay (Nguyen 2020), and critical success factors of contractors 
(Alzahrani and Emsley 2013). Accordingly, this model is used to predict the binary 
outcome of overrun experienced by a project (1 = overrun predicted; 0 = no overrun 




1 − 𝑌U = 𝑏W + 𝑏Y𝑋Y+. . . 	𝑏2𝑋2	
 
(3) 
The left-hand side of the equation, or logit, is the log of the ratio of success 
probability to failure probability, where Y is the probability of success. The right-hand 
side is a combination of variables (𝑋2) with their associated beta weights (	𝑏2) and 
addition of the intercept 𝑏W. The independent variables (𝑋2) on the equation’s right-hand 
side are combinations of seven categories (Contracting Offices, Funding Offices, 
Procurement data, Climate Zones, Award Type, Project Type, and Award Type). The 
combinations of contract attributes create a model that outputs probabilities between 0 
and 1, and a set threshold determines if the model predicts a project as experiencing 
overrun or not. The following eight models were created using various combinations of 
variables: Cost overrun (DoD, Air Force, Army, and Navy) and Schedule overrun (DoD, 
Air Force, Army, and Navy). Before analysis, the attribute categories were converted to 
flag variables, and the numeric attributes were normalized using min-max normalization. 
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See Table 4-2 for all the tested attributes and their associated type, category, and 
explanation.  
Table 4-2 Contract attributes used for analysis with their associated type, category, and 
a brief explanation of what the attribute represents within the data. 
Attribute	 Type	 Category	 Explanation	
C_AFCEC	 Factor	 Contracting	Office	 Contract	executed	by	the	Air	Force	Civil	Engineer	Center	
C_USACE	 Factor	 Contracting	Office	 Contract	executed	by	the	U.S.	Army	Corps	of	Engineers	
C_NAVFAC	 Factor	 Contracting	Office	 Contract	executed	by	the	Naval	Facilities	Engineering	Systems	Command	
C_Base	 Factor	 Contracting	Office	 Contract	executed	by	a	squadron/unit	on	the	installation	(not	outsourced)	
C_Other	 Factor	 Contracting	Office	 Contract	executed	by	an	entity	not	represented	above	
F_AFCEC	 Factor	 Funding	Office	 Funding	provided	by	the	Air	Force	Civil	Engineer	Center	
F_USACE	 Factor	 Funding	Office	 Funding	provided	by	the	U.S.	Army	Corps	of	Engineers	
F_NAVFAC	 Factor	 Funding	Office	 Funding	provided	by	the	Naval	Facilities	Engineering	Systems	Command	
F_Base	 Factor	 Funding	Office	 Funding	provided	by	a	squadron/unit	on	the	installation	(not	outsourced)	
F_Other	 Factor	 Funding	Office	 Funding	provided	by	an	entity	not	represented	above	
September	 Factor	 Procurement	Data	 Contract	awarded	in	the	month	of	September,	the	end	of	the	fiscal	year	
mmInitialCost	 Numeric	 Procurement	Data	 The	programmed	cost	of	the	project,	normalized	
mmInitialDuration	 Numeric	 Procurement	Data	 The	programmed	duration	of	the	project,	normalized	
mmNumberofOffers	 Numeric	 Procurement	Data	 The	number	of	offers/bids	a	project	receives	from	contractors,	normalized	
CZone1	 Factor	 Climate	Zone	 Climate	Zone	1	from	the	International	Energy	Conservation	Code	(IECC)	
CZone2	 Factor	 Climate	Zone	 Climate	Zone	2	from	the	IECC	
CZone3	 Factor	 Climate	Zone	 Climate	Zone	3	from	the	IECC	
CZone4	 Factor	 Climate	Zone	 Climate	Zone	4	from	the	IECC	
CZone5	 Factor	 Climate	Zone	 Climate	Zone	5	from	the	IECC	
CZone6	 Factor	 Climate	Zone	 Climate	Zone	6	from	the	IECC	
CZone7	 Factor	 Climate	Zone	 Climate	Zone	7	from	the	IECC	
CZone8	 Factor	 Climate	Zone	 Climate	Zone	8	from	the	IECC	
Competed	 Factor	 Procurement	Data	 There	was	competitive	solicitation	of	contractors	for	the	project	
Y1	 Factor	 Project	Type	 Y1	Product	or	Service	Code--Construction	of	Structures	and	Facilities	
Z1	 Factor	 Project	Type	 Z1	Product	or	Service	Code--Maintenance	of	Structures	and	Facilities	
Z2	 Factor	 Project	Type	 Z2	Product	or	Service	Code--Repair	or	Alteration	of	Structures	and	Facilities	
MILCON	 Factor	 Contract	Type	 The	final	approval	authority	is	Congress	
FirmFixed	 Factor	 Contract	Type	 Contract	is	any	variation	of	a	Firm	Fixed	contract	
Cost	 Factor	 Contract	Type	 Contract	is	any	variation	of	a	Cost-Plus	contract	
DefinitiveContract	 Factor	 Award	Type	 Project	awarded	as	a	definitive	contract	
DeliveryOrder	 Factor	 Award	Type	 Contract	for	property	that	does	not	procure/specify	a	firm	quantity	of	property	
PurchaseOrder	 Factor	 Award	Type	 Purchase	orders	represent	single	business	transactions	
Construction	 Factor	 Project	Type	 Project	is	classified	as	Construction	under	North	American	Industry	Classification	(NAICS)	
Manufacturing	 Factor	 Project	Type	 Project	is	classified	as	Manufacturing	under	NAICS	
Admin	Services	 Factor	 Project	Type	 Project	is	classified	as	Admin	and	Services	under	NAICS	
Vertical	 Factor	 Project	Type	 Project	consists	of	Vertical	Construction,	based	on	NAICS	classification	
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Since there are many variable combinations, forward stepwise regression was 
used to determine which factors were significant and which combination of factors 
produced optimal model performance. This process is depicted in Figure 4-5. 
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Figure 4-5 Stepwise logistic regression process: Variable selection and accuracy 
determination. 
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Since the logistic regression output is a number between 0 and 1, the threshold 
value was set to 0.5, which aligns with current literature that nearly half of projects 
experience cost and schedule overrun. If a project received a probability of 0.5 or greater, 
it received a predicted classification or experience overrun; otherwise, it was classified as 
not experiencing overrun. The whole process was iterated until the solution converged. 
Logistic Regression: Model and Results Validation 
A visual inspection of the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves is the 
first step in validating model effectiveness for predicting cost and schedule overrun 
likelihood. These curves output a true positive and false positive value for every possible 
classification threshold. The shape of the curves indicates performance ability; if the 
model curve lies above the no information rate (NIR) curve, the model performs better 
than the NIR. Likewise, if the model curve mimics or lies below the NIR, the model 
performs as good or worse than the NIR. The NIR is calculated using Equation (4). 
 
 






The next step in model validation is a numeric assessment of model performance. 
In this analysis, performance is measured in three ways: classification accuracy, 
sensitivity, and specificity. Equations (5), (6), and (7) below describe these measures. 
 
 



















The accuracy indicates if the model performs better or worse in overall 
classification than the NIR. If the accuracy is greater than the NIR, the model has better 
performance. While accuracy is a good summary statistic, the sensitivity and specificity 
reveal the skew in the model to classify one category better than another. 
Random Forest Classification 
Random forest classification is used to predict the magnitude of overrun on the 
projects that experience cost or schedule overrun. Of the 79,894 projects, 34,664 projects 
experience cost overrun, and 28,067 projects experience schedule overrun. RFC is a 
supervised machine learning algorithm that introduces randomness to the normal decision 
tree classification process. It randomly combines multiple variables at tree splits and 
compares various iterations to determine an overall accuracy. This method was chosen 
for its ability to classify or categorize data based on the use of various input variable 
types, including ordinal, continuous, and interval. RFC has been successfully applied in 
construction research regarding the strength of materials (Han et al. 2019), construction 
site safety risks (Poh et al. 2018), and predicting the level of delay from common sources 
of delay as seen on-site (Yaseen et al. 2020). Accordingly, this research employs RFC to 
predict the magnitude of overruns using contract data.  
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For this analysis, 2 to 7 variables were combined at each split, comparing 100-500 
trees. The combination with the highest accuracy was considered the best model. Many 
variations of RFC models were tested to determine the best classification method and the 
ability for the models to predict within different subsets of data. Table 4-3 describes the 
classification method used for every model on the various data subsets. 



















Four model variations were used: (1) K-Means clustering to determine the 
overrun clusters ranges for classification; (2) K-Means to cluster the data, excluding the 
overrun amount, into multiple categories and used those category values as attributes in 
the classification process; (3) equally proportioned (EP) categories (i.e., all three of four 




The results are organized to reflect the order of the methodology. First, the 
variable selection outcomes of all eight cost and schedule overrun logistic regression 
models are addressed.  Next, the accuracies and performance of each model are presented 
and compared. Lastly, the performance of the random forest classification models is 
summarized. 
Logistic Regression: Significant Variables 
The forward stepwise logistic regression process served multiple purposes for this 
analysis. It was used to identify significant attributes, optimize model performance 
through various attribute combinations, output attribute influence (positive/negative) and 
magnitude, and evaluate the overall effectiveness of contract attributes prediction 
capability in cost and schedule overrun likelihood. Figure 4-6 provides a summary of the 
most influential attributes, which were significant in at least five of the eight models. 
Each column in this table represents each model. 
 
		 Cost	Overrun	Models		 		 Schedule	Overrun	Models		
Attributes		 DoD		 AF		 Army		 Navy		 		 DoD		 AF		 Army		 Navy*		
Intercept		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
C_USACE		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
C_Base		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
F_Base		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
September		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
mmInitialDuration		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Y1		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Z1		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
MILCON		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
DefinitiveContract		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
DeliveryOrder		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
PurchaseOrder		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Note:	*	indicates	model	was	not	significant	at	the	95%	confidence	level		
Figure 4-6 Summary of the direction and magnitude of the most influential attributes for 
all eight likelihood models, based on the attribute logistic regression coefficient values. 
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Each column represents the top attributes of the respective models. This color chart uses 
green to represent an increase in overrun probability, red to represent a decrease in 
overrun probability, and black to indicate an insignificant attribute. Lighter colors 
represent attributes with lower influence, whereas darker colors represent those 
attributes with higher influence.  
The most influential attribute categories in increasing the probability of a project 
experiencing overrun are Procurement Data (mmInitialDuration and September) and 
Award Type (DefinitiveContract, DeliveryOrder, and PurchaseOrder). 
The initial duration (mmInitialDuration) has the largest positive influence for cost 
overrun models. As the initial duration of a project increases, the probability of cost 
overrun also increases. Initial duration is also the most influential factor for schedule 
overrun models, though it varies between positive and negative influence. The other 
procurement data attribute, September, also positively influences overrun in every model, 
though its influence is smaller. Notably, initial cost (mmInitialCost) was not a significant 
attribute, regardless of the variable combinations. Within the award type category, 
DefinitiveContract has the largest positive influence on overrun for all models but navy 
schedule overrun. Delivery Order also has a positive influence on overrun for all models 
but one, though its magnitude is smaller. Many factors were significant at the DoD 
(global) level, but the significance and influence varied across subsets; the opposite is 
also true.  
Logistic Regression: Performance 
This section displays the variable combinations with the highest accuracies. The 
first step of performance evaluation is an inspection of ROC curves. Upon visual 
inspection, most models perform better than the NIR. The navy schedule overrun model 
appears to perform similarly to the NIR. More variability exists within cost overrun 
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models than schedule overrun models, though these differences in performance are 
difficult to qualify. Accordingly, the quantitative measures of performance provide useful 
insights into the various deviations in model results. Table 4-4 summarizes these 
performance metrics for each of the eight models.  
 
Table 4-4 Measures of performance for cost and schedule overrun logistic regression 
models. 
	 Cost	Overrun	Models	 	 Schedule	Overrun	Models	
	 DoD		 AF	 Army	 Navy		 	 DoD		 AF		 Army	 Navy*		
Sample	Size	 79,894	 21,554	 29,941	 23,966	 	 79,894	 21,554	 29,941	 23,966	
Accuracy	 64-66%	 61-63%	 61-63%	 72-74%	 	 67-68%	 60-62%	 65-67%	 75-77%	
NIR	 57%	 50%	 52%	 71%	 	 65%	 57%	 63%	 75%	
Sensitivity	 82%	 67%	 79%	 95%	 	 92%	 78%	 90%	 99%	
Specificity	 43%	 57%	 43%	 19%	 	 22%	 39%	 24%	 5%	
	 Note:	*	indicates	model	was	not	significant	at	the	95%	confidence	level	
 
A 95% confidence interval is used to define model accuracy. Additionally, the 
solution remained stable regardless of testing threshold values between 0.4 and 0.6. All 
models are statistically significant except for the navy schedule overrun model, indicating 
they more accurately classify projects than the NIR. Additionally, every model does a 
better job of classifying projects that do not experience overrun than projects that 
experience overrun. Projects that did not experience overrun were correctly classified by 
the DoD cost and schedule models, nearly 82% and 92%, respectively. Conversely, these 
models only correctly classified 43% and 22% of the projects that experienced overrun, 
respectively. The AF cost overrun model performs with 11% greater accuracy than the 
NIR. While the Navy cost overrun model appears to have much higher accuracy than the 
other models, this is expected as the subset of navy contracts have a higher rate of 
experiencing no overrun. When the Navy model accuracy is compared with the NIR, its 
performance, while statistically significant, performs only marginally better. 
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Random Forest Classification Performance 
The final phase of analysis was predicting the magnitude of overrun for the 
projects that experienced overrun. The median cost and schedule overrun are 149% and 
36%, respectively. Since models for the likelihood of overrun were created using contract 
attributes, the next step in the process is determining if these same attributes are 
beneficial in predicting how much overrun a project will experience. RFC was used to 
accomplish this step. Table 4-5 provides a summary of the classification accuracy 
compared to the NIR for each model variation. 
Table 4-5 Random forest classification model accuracy compared with the no 
information rate for all cost and schedule overrun models. 
Model	 Accuracy	
(%)	
NIR	(%)	 Difference	 Splits	 #	of	Trees	
1C	 52.35	 51.26	 1.09*	 4	 300	
1S	 57.26	 55.70	 1.56*	 4	 300	
2C	 43.28	 34.00	 9.28***	 4	 200	
2S	 44.09	 33.61	 10.48***	 5	 300	
3C	 51.83	 51.27	 0.57*	 4	 200	
3S	 47.51	 54.93	 -7.42	 2	 100	
4C	 42.74	 34.00	 8.74***	 5	 300	
4S	 44.97	 33.61	 11.36***	 4	 200	
5C	 62.10	 58.98	 3.12**	 5	 300	
5S	 68.26	 66.39	 1.87*	 5	 300	
6C	 47.61	 47.40	 0.21*	 4	 200	
6S	 40.62	 37.40	 3.22**	 3	 100	
7C	 38.70	 39.79	 -1.09	 4	 200	
7S	 30.75	 26.92	 3.83**	 3	 300	
8C	 39.66	 34.01	 5.65***	 4	 200	
8S	 70.93	 63.95	 1.58*	 3	 200	
9C	 32.61	 25.01	 7.60***	 7	 200	
9S	 30.63	 25.01	 5.62***	 4	 200	
10C	 43.38	 43.01	 0.37*	 2	 300	
10S	 56.73	 53.01	 3.72**	 3	 300	
11C	 36.01	 33.82	 2.19*	 2	 300	
11S	 43.97	 43.06	 0.91*	 3	 300	
12C	 59.23	 60.76	 -1.53	 7	 100	
12S	 61.10	 53.79	 7.31***	 5	 100	
13C	 27.85	 25.00	 2.85*	 5	 300	




There are varying results amongst the models. Less than half of the models 
performed only 2-3% greater than the NIR. Three models performed worse, indicating 
these models are not useful for classification purposes, at least given the current data and 
attributes used. The best model, model 4S, performed 11.36% better than the NIR. This 
model classified schedule overrun into three equally proportioned categories using 
grouping clusters as an attribute. Splitting the data into lower and upper subsets and 
creating individual models was somewhat successful as well. Additionally, in most cases, 
classifying the projects into balanced/even proportioned categories proved more accurate 
than using K-Means clustering to determine the classification categories.  
Results Summary 
The likelihood modeling is currently more successful with prediction than the 
random forest classification modeling efforts in this analysis. The likelihood modeling 
revealed a strong relationship between the programmed duration (mmInitialDuration) of 
the project and overrun. Additionally, the type of award also highly influenced overrun 
on a project. Though RFC was less successful than likelihood modeling, it further 
revealed the ability to classify projects into categories of overrun. The use of equally 
proportioned categories for RFC modeling proved more successful than using clustering 
techniques to form categories. 
Discussion 
The structure of this section is broken down into three main areas, which highlight 
the contributions of the research. Individual attributes and their significance are reviewed 
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first. Then the model accuracy and classification impact are discussed. Finally, 
discussions on the limitations and broader applicability of this research are provided. 
Significant Attributes 
Some of the more significant attributes are the initial (i.e., estimated) duration, the 
month of award, and award type. These results align with previous literature and provide 
additional evidence of the similarities between public and private construction industry 
projects. This alignment with the literature also suggests that the use of logistic regression 
in the identification of contract attributes correlated with overrun is validated. 
Accordingly, based on their importance to the modeling efforts and applicability to the 
industry as a whole, these attributes are discussed further. 
Procurement Data - Initial Duration 
Initial duration is one aspect of project size that has been shown to affect project 
performance. Previous research regarding the correlation between initial duration and 
overrun indicates that it can have a negative effect (Jahren 1991), a positive effect (Odeck 
2004b), or not be of significance (Love et al. 2013). However, this research has found 
that initial duration, or the estimated duration at the award, is the attribute with the single 
greatest effect on overrun probability. Unlike the previous studies, though, the scale and 
diversity of the data set used in the analysis present a unique result that implicates longer 
initial durations with an increased probability of cost overruns. This result is likely due to 
project length being associated with project complexity. Projects of a month or less may 
be more routine and less complicated projects, such as maintenance or repair requests, 
reducing variability and the chance of unforeseen errors/conditions. This assertion is 
further confirmed by a decreased probability of overruns for those projects classified as 
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maintenance. It should be noted that as the initial duration increased, it served to reduce 
the probability of schedule overrun within the DoD model. This could be the result of 
increased float days or over-estimation of the duration in longer projects, but as it is not 
consistent across all models and even serves to increase the probability in others, further 
investigation would be required. 
Procurement Data - Month of Award 
For US federal spending, including DoD construction, September is the last 
month to award projects within the fiscal year due to funds being constrained to each 
fiscal year. This process is similar in private industry only that the funds available to 
them are not “use or lose” but instead crucial for tax and accounting purposes. Thal et al. 
(2010) discuss how project award month positively correlates to increased contingency. 
Our findings further validate that projects awarded in the last quarter of the fiscal year, 
specifically September, increase the probability a project will experience cost/schedule 
overrun. However, September is more influential in schedule overrun models, which 
implies that a project awarded in the final month of the fiscal year has a greater 
probability of experiencing schedule overrun than cost overrun. Nearly 40% of the 
projects contained in the data set were issued in September, which provides a much larger 
sample from which overruns could occur. This information does not discredit the finding, 
though, because it is very well known that unallocated funds that could not be spent by 
installations are typically shared among others. This last-minute notification of funds can 
lead to ill-defined requirements and scopes for projects, which leads to additional cost 




Multiple studies have analyzed the performance of different contract 
compositions and found procurement (Dicks et al. 2017), delivery (Zhang et al. 2019), 
and payment methods (Bogus et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2016) influenced outcomes. 
Conversely, other research indicated execution methods had no significant effect 
(Hashem Mehany et al. 2018). This study finds that a relationship between the award type 
and cost and schedule overrun does exist. Of the different award types, definitive 
contracts were the most influential in increasing the probability of overrun. According to 
the FAR, definitive contracts are all contract actions except those executed under an 
Indefinite-Delivery Vehicle (IDV). The results indicate that projects requiring a stand-
alone contract action with a definite time frame and quantity are more likely to have 
overrun than those IDV actions with specific clauses altering the time or quantity of the 
order to an indefinite nature. While the reasons for this are currently unknown, creating 
data subsets based on this contract type and performing additional analyses could prove 
useful in future research.   
Model Accuracy  
Overall, model accuracy is very similar between cost and schedule overrun 
classifications. The DoD model outperforms branch-specific models except for the cost 
overrun model for the Navy. At first glance, this may suggest that a larger, more diverse 
dataset equates to better results. However, the DoD model accuracy is being augmented 
by the Navy model accuracy as it is higher. Regardless, the model accuracy is higher than 
the no-information rate for all models except the schedule overrun Navy model. 
Therefore, every model still performs better than chance. The performance could be the 
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result of the number of design/procurement phase attributes compared to construction. 
The more likely cause for lower accuracy is the variation between the projects and results 
in considerable noise within the data set. However, this variability in the size, type, and 
location of projects allows the model to be broadly applied to the entire DoD construction 
portfolio. 
As shown in Table 4-4, sensitivity is higher than specificity, meaning the models 
more accurately classified projects with no cost or schedule overrun. Considering 56% of 
the projects in the data experience no cost or schedule overrun, this model can classify 
the majority of the data. This information is valuable and could be used to prevent 
additional resources from being spent scrutinizing a project which may not be warranted.  
Limitations 
Based on previous research, it is likely that the model accuracy could be improved 
with the addition of several attributes not currently available in the system where these 
data were procured. Attributes like the delta between cost estimate and award price 
(Jahren 1991), risk assessment values for pre-bid documents (Lee and Yi 2017; Son and 
Lee 2019), team performance history (Dada 2014), contractor performance history, and 
improved project type classifications (Bhargava et al. 2010) have benefited previous 
analyses. Model accuracy would likely also improve with the implementation of a more 
objective and standardized method for data entry. Values of zero initial cost or estimated 
duration were not uncommon. Additionally, issues such as inconsistencies between the 
classification of project types and reasons for modifications (i.e., change orders) could 
likely have contributed to the lack of significance for attributes that proved significant in 
previous research. It should also be noted that overrun is strictly an objective term and 
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does not take into consideration the constructive nature or value-added of some 
modifications. Therefore, additional information regarding the modification is required to 
make better-informed decisions. 
Further analysis of these data was conducted to classify the magnitude of cost and 
schedule overruns a project would experience. The work focused on the use of a random 
forest classification algorithm to model the magnitude of overrun for those projects that 
did experience it into predetermined bins (e.g., 0-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, etc.). Overall, 
the model accuracies were low though some were successful at classifying magnitude 
better than the NIR, as shown in Table 4-5. Given the data’s breadth and variety, there 
currently may not be enough similarity for the RFC algorithm to learn and classify 
projects correctly. Had the projects been more homogeneous, the algorithm could have 
likely produced more accurate results and should improve as more projects are added to 
the dataset. Therefore, given these results, it is logical to conclude that the use of RF 
algorithms is a viable option for classifying the magnitude of overrun despite the limited 
granularity in category sizes (e.g., 0-50% overrun).  
Conclusions 
The prevalence and detrimental impacts of cost and schedule overruns on 
construction projects have made the search for their causes vital to improving failing 
infrastructure and the continued success of construction programs. Previous research has 
shown that modifying project procurement and contracting methods have served to 
mitigate the occurrence of overruns. Not having been the focus of much research, this 
work analyzes the DoD construction portfolio, 48% of which experience overrun. 
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Accordingly, a means to identify the contract attributes that correlate to poorer project 
performance was investigated.  
Logistic regression has proven an invaluable method in medical and social 
sciences research. Similarly, RFC models are used for classification and multiple 
prediction efforts within these same fields. To the author’s knowledge, however, neither 
of these methods have been used to predict the likelihood and magnitude of construction 
overruns. The result was an efficient way to predict cost and schedule overrun that could 
be applied to future projects identifying those at risk with probabilistic modeling in lieu 
of deterministic (e.g., linear regression). Eight models were created using logistic 
regression to predict the likelihood of overruns (i.e., binary output), with accuracies 
varying between 66% and 75% for cost and schedule, respectively.  
Additionally, this study identified several attributes that significantly impacted the 
likelihood of overrun, including initial duration, award month, and award type (i.e., 
definitive or IDV). The likelihood of overrun was seen to increase as a project’s awarded 
duration increased. A similar increase in overrun was found to occur for projects as their 
award month approached the end of the fiscal year. Furthermore, those projects with 
definitive award contract types were found to have a greater likelihood to experience 
overrun than those of indefinite such as indefinite delivery indefinite quantity. These 
results will aid owners, project managers, and planners by providing insights into the 
risks associated with their projects and allowing for the implementation of mitigation 
techniques.  
These results also demonstrate the use of project procurement data, through cost 
and schedule overrun likelihood predictions at the DoD-level, could help project 
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managers make better data-informed decisions, resulting in improved proactive 
construction planning and better cost management. This could take the form of revised 
guidance and more strict project award controls for projects containing high-risk factors 
as identified previously. These findings could also be used to identify the level of 
maturation and vetting that must occur for a project’s scope, definition, requirements, and 
subsequent documentation. 
Ultimately, this exploration of DoD-level cost and schedule overrun prediction 
modeling is one of the first of its kind in terms of size and diversity of data analyzed. 
Containing 79,894 projects, the quantity of data used in this study is an order of 
magnitude greater than the next largest sample from previous studies. Moreover, the data 
used here covers 281 different types of construction. These hallmark features provide a 
more holistic view of the contract factors that play a significant role in the project 
performance of entire construction portfolios in lieu of the project-centric conclusions of 
previous studies.  
Future research should focus on better predicting the magnitude of overrun a 
project will experience. Knowing how much a project may increase in cost and schedule 
can facilitate more accurate planning and contingency. Improving the accuracy of both 
likelihood and magnitude predictions may be accomplished through including additional 
contract attributes (i.e., government estimate, planning time, etc.), and the addition of the 
human factors of construction such as contractor quality, team cordiality, political 
climate, and expert opinions. 
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Article Summary 
This article covers the investigation and outcome of a study conducted to identify 
the sources of cost and schedule overrun within DoD construction. Contract data are 
compared with performance indicators to determine which attributes increase the 
likelihood of overruns and how this information can be used to improve project planning.   
The Problem 
48% of DoD projects completed in the last decade have experienced some form of 
overrun. Additional metrics outlining the severity of overrun issues in DoD construction 
are shown in Figure 5-1. Despite technological and organizational advances in 
construction planning and execution, these issues persist. These issues occur at the 
expense of overtasked contracting and construction personnel, altered budgets, and 
ultimately, the ability to award future projects. Deferring projects can result in delays in 
mission-essential readiness, missed requirements, lower morale, and reduced 
effectiveness. Furthermore, cost and schedule overrun can lead to a need to use fixed 
operations and maintenance funds. With more than 585,000 facilities to maintain and an 
existing $116 billion backlog of projects, the causes of these overruns must be identified 
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and mitigated through every available means (Cronk 2018; Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 2019). 
 
Figure 5-1 Summary of DoD Construction Contract Performance 
For at least the past four decades, researchers performed hundreds of analyses on 
overrun using various methods, including surveys, questionnaires, statistical regression, 
and even machine learning (Durdyev and Hosseini 2018; Zidane and Andersen 2018). 
The first two methods ranked respondent responses while the latter two primarily focused 
on the attributes (e.g., contract type, delivery method, sector of construction) of contract 
data or bid documents to identify and mitigate the causes of overrun. However, even as a 
considerable consumer of construction, the DoD has not found itself at the center of 
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much of this research. Furthermore, the development of smarter, more effectively 
executed contracts is a current priority of the National Defense Strategy .  
Through a partnership between the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) and 
the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), a research project was funded to review 
and analyze the contract data for all military projects designated as maintenance, 
alteration, repair, or construction. Ultimately, the research focused on determining which 
contract attribute(s) significantly affected project performance. 
Analyzing the Data 
Using the Federal Procurement Database System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) 
(now beta.SAM.gov), construction contract data from the past ten years was obtained and 
transformed into a construction repository housing 79,894 DoD projects (Stout et al. 
2020). These data contained attributes like the location, duration, cost, and modifications 
associated with the maintenance, alteration, repair, and construction of real property. 
Initial statistical analysis of this data revealed that there were, in fact, differences between 
the performance of projects based on attributes like contracting agents, funding agents, 
and award months. These results proved informative and would serve as the foundation 
for future, more in-depth analysis. 
Further investigation using logistic regression produced models that accounted for 
the complex interactions between contract attributes to help predict the likelihood of 
overruns and to grasp a holistic view of the attribute’s roles in overrun occurrence. The 
dependent variable (overrun) was converted from a percentage to a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
for all projects. Eight models were created to determine the significance of each attribute 
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concerning this outcome. The results were twofold: 1) Models that could predict whether 
a project experienced overrun and 2) an understanding of how each significant attribute 
changes a project’s probability of overrun.  
Accuracies ranging between 66% and 75% were achieved. Additionally, all 
models exceeded the no information rate, a key performance indicator for logistic 
regression modeling. The no information rate is, essentially, an educated guess given no 
other information beyond the distributions of the attributes contained within the data. In 
other words, if we know that 50% of all DoD projects experienced overrun, then we have 
a 50% chance of guessing that a given project experiences overrun. The drawback of this 
model was that the accuracy lay in predicting the likelihood of a project that would not 
experience overrun. However, this information is still of use to planners and 
programmers because it identifies projects that represent less risk and likely require no 
additional vetting or mitigation methods to prevent cost or schedule overruns.  
The contract attributes that greatly increased the probability of overrun across the 
DoD were the project duration at award, award type (i.e., purchase order, delivery order, 
bid-purchase agreement, definitive contracts), and award month. For the length of 
duration at award, the probability that a project will experience an overrun increases as 
the project’s length increases. Definitive contracts increased the likelihood of overrun 
compared to other award types, including delivery orders. Additionally, projects awarded 
in September were found to have a higher probability of overrun than any other month. A 
closer look at each month revealed that nearly 50% of all projects awarded at the end of 
the fiscal year experienced overrun while, on average, the other months experienced only 
39%. However, 38% of DoD projects were issued in September, larger than any other 
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month. Additional data, not currently available in FPDS, and further analysis would be 
required to better understand each attribute’s significance in the probability of overrun. 
Moving Forward 
While the goal of this investigation was to aid planners and programmers in 
analyzing the risk of overruns using contract attributes currently available in FPDS-NG, 
its impact stretches beyond post-hoc analysis. This research could serve as the starting 
point for data-informed decisions regarding planning within DoD construction. Decisions 
currently made based on personal experience, expertise, and opinion could incorporate 
more objective lessons learned from the success and failure of past projects (DoD-wide). 
Additionally, this data can be used to assess construction project execution efficacy at the 
base-level to fine-tune local procurement methods and as a means of performance 
reporting and accountability should it be required. Ultimately, these analyses and 
decisions rely on the veracity and relevancy of their source. Therefore, improving 
existing attributes, adding supplemental information, and maintaining an up-to-date 
repository of projects is vital to ensuring success.  
Accordingly, this research concluded by providing a list of changes that could be 
implemented in contract data tracking to increase the DoD’s capability to curb overruns 
through more effective risk management in the procurement process. It was noted that, 
throughout this research effort, several of the contract attributes recorded in FPDS-NG 
were input inconsistently. Moreover, a review of previous overrun studies revealed 
additional attributes of construction projects that could be used to increase the modeling 
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accuracy (i.e., predicting project performance) and create a better understanding of the 
causes of overrun when they do occur. 
Improvements to existing attributes: 
○ Prevent zero values for awarded cost and duration - an additional 52,768 
projects were excluded because of this issue 
○ Provide objective guidance for product service code (PSC) entry (e.g., 
what is construction v. repair)  
○ Provide specific reasons for modifications (e.g., “design error - voltage for 
chiller incorrectly specified” ) 
Additional attributes: 
○ Government estimate to compare to award price 
○ Contractor evaluation (e.g., CPARS) 
○ Type(s) of work (by percentage) of man-hours/cost (e.g., HVAC, 
electrical, civil, etc.) involved in the project 
○ Controllable v. Uncontrollable modification reasons (e.g., scope creep = 
controllable cost increase, rain = uncontrollable delay)  
○ Value-added v. not added indication for modifications (e.g., value-added = 
an omission that is required to make the facility complete and usable) 
○ Information from engineering databases like TRIRIGA, BUILDER, and 
TRACES 
■ Pay apps and project progress 
■ Building and component conditions 
■ Project metrics (e.g., sq. ft. of renovation or length of road)  
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For the Future - Create an ad-hoc system, rather than post-hoc reports 
○ A system designed to give real-time metrics of projects. Used for planning 
future projects and reflecting on lessons learned from past projects 
■ Actual working days versus available working days 
■ Percentage of equipment downtime 
■ Percentage of labor downtime 
■ Time to rectify defects 
■ Number of accidents 
■ Problems discovered in construction documentation 
■ Logging requests for information and responses 
○ Include live-time Top Factors of “Non-Value Added, Controllable Cost 
Overrun,” “Value Added, Controllable Cost Overrun,” etc. 
○ Enable real-time access to average cost/schedule overrun of current 
projects, past projects, specific project types, etc. 
The vast majority of these attributes already exist in some form or fashion within 
project documentation or even within other databases used by the DoD. Researchers, 
planners, and programmers would benefit from a centralized system that maintains this 
information, if for no other reason than to provide a project-specific source of lessons 
learned. By arming DoD personnel with this knowledge, it is hoped that future 
construction projects will be delivered with fewer overruns enabling the DoD to fund 
more projects and reduce its current backlog. 
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Conclusion – Mitigating Overruns in DoD Construction 
This research illustrates both the prevalence and impact of cost and schedule 
overruns within DoD construction by creating a repository that houses all construction, 
repair, alteration, and maintenance task orders from the past decade. From this repository, 
it was determined that 48% of projects had experienced some form of overrun, totaling 
over $500 billion in unplanned expenditures. These overruns diminish funding for 
concurrent projects, deplete operational budgets that cause deferred infrastructure 
maintenance, and impair future project award ability. To aid in the reduction of an 
existing $116 billion backlog in projects, the DoD must address these overruns in new 
and innovative ways. 
Accordingly, this research demonstrates the application of and efficacy in using 
historical DoD construction contract data in objectively identifying projects that will 
experience cost and schedule overrun. This same data was also shown to be useful in 
predicting the magnitude of project overruns. Consequently, projects that are at risk for 
experiencing overruns can be identified before their award. Additional measures and 
resources can then be selectively applied to help mitigate overrun occurrence based on 
both the risk assessment of the project and risk tolerance of the organization. 
Research Significance 
Studies focusing on identifying the sources of cost and schedule overrun have 
been ongoing for at least the past 40 years. In that time, existing research has found that 
the sources vary between projects, locations, and parties. However, these same studies 
have used methods that may be overfit, introduce biases, or are based on limited data sets. 
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Moreover, the DoD has garnered little attention from previous research in this field. The 
data used in this analysis is the single largest source of construction contract information 
to the authors' knowledge, containing 79,894 projects. Furthermore, as the database spans 
281 types of construction and contains 62 contract attributes, the conclusions drawn from 
this work offer more robust results that can be more broadly applied to the DoD’s diverse 
portfolio of facilities and infrastructure in an attempt to mitigate overrun. 
While additional factors contribute to overruns within DoD construction projects, 
including inclement weather, contractor performance, and poor requirement definition, 
this research demonstrates that skillful models can be created to inform planners and 
programmers of the risks posed by specific attributes of contract data. The DoD must 
consider historical construction contract data when planning future projects.   
Research Contributions 
This research offered the first large-scale review at DoD construction. It 
reinforced the need to track historical construction spending for which a repository was 
created using key attributes of contract data from FPDS-NG (Chapter 3). Furthermore, 
this thesis reviewed the capability of predicting the likelihood and magnitude of overruns 
within DoD construction. The applicability of logistic regression was demonstrated by 
creating a binary output with regard to whether a project was going to experience overrun 
(i.e., overrun?, ‘yes’ or ‘no’). RFC was also identified as a means to predict the 
magnitude of overrun a project is likely to experience (Chapter 4).  
In using the database and methods established in this thesis, DoD planners and 
programmers are empowered with the ability to analyze future projects, providing an 
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objective assessment of risk which could inform execution strategies like the need for 
further scope development, alternative contracting methods, or deferment of projects to 
create a more risk-neutral portfolio based on current priorities. By reviewing, analyzing, 
and modifying planning and procurement methods based on performance metrics (i.e., 
data-driven decisions), the DoD can better align itself with the National Defense 
Strategy’s directive to develop smarter contracts and execute contracts more effectively. 
As part of this work, a poster presentation was created and culminated in the 
development of two journal articles, which created a construction task order database 
(Chapter 3) and determined contract attributes most significantly correlated with project 
performance (Chapter 4). 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This research explored the relevance and impact of cost and schedule overruns in 
DoD construction by creating a historical database. Additionally, methods to identify 
those contract attributes significantly correlated with project performance using logistic 
regression and RFC were determined. Accordingly, there are several areas where this 
research could be expanded: 
1. Sub-setting data: Analyzing the data in smaller quantities based on specific award 
months, contracting agents, or project types could result in alternate attributes 
significantly correlated with project performance. Identifying those attributes that 
apply to only a smaller sample of projects could lead to amended execution 
strategies, thereby expanding the DoD’s capabilities in mitigating overruns.  
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2. Inclusion of additional data: It was noted in literature that several attributes not 
present in FPDS-NG served to enhance the skillfulness of modeling efforts used 
to predict the likelihood and magnitude of cost and schedule overrun. These 
attributes include, but are not limited to, the programmed estimate, project metrics 
(e.g., sq. ft. of flooring), and contractor performance. It is expected that if these 
and other similar attributes were incorporated into the task order database from 
sources such as TRACES or TRIRIGA, the skillfulness of the methods used here 
could be enhanced.  
3. Alternative Machine Learning Techniques: Several techniques outside of logistic 
regression and RFC have shown proficiency in quantifying the probability and 
magnitude of risk associated with overruns. Research could focus on comparing 
these techniques' capabilities, which include text mining, principal component 
analysis, ensemble learning, and fuzzy logic to determine the optimal method, or 
methods, which further mitigate overrun in future awards.  
Among others, these avenues provide further research and development opportunities for 
mitigating cost and schedule overrun in DoD construction projects.  
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6.  Appendix 
This section includes the statistical comparison between the factors of the 
contracting agent, funding agent, and award month that were not published. This effort 
was undertaken at the behest of AFCEC to investigate whether project performance could 
be improved by selecting any one factor comprising these attributes. Subsequent sections 
of this appendix offer further insights into each of these attributes to include descriptive 
statistics.  
The research uses statistical analysis software, SPSS, to conduct the comparison 
between the various factors of each attribute. This software is well known and commonly 
used for this type of work. Additionally, a comparison of means between these factors is 
a readily accepted method within mathematical and social sciences to determine if 
significant differences exist. As the residuals’ distribution is not assumed to be normal, 
the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was used to compare each of the attributes’ 
overrun rates. This test compares the variance of each factor’s ranked overrun 
percentages and, as it is a form of ANOVA, tests the difference between only two each 
time.  
Consequently, each factor is compared to every other factor in a single test (i.e., 
pairwise comparisons). We can also not assume that each of the factors’ distributions is 
similar and must use the mean or average ranked overrun in lieu of comparing the 
medians. The average ranked overrun is computed by ranking all of the overrun 
percentages from 1 to N without their groupings (i.e., the factor within each attribute is 
disregarded when projects are ranked). Once the rankings have been assigned, an average 
of the ranks within each factor is calculated.  
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All pairwise comparisons with an adjusted significance of 0.05 or lower provide 
the test’s confidence level, ensuring a true difference between the factors. That is not to 
say that greater significance levels (e.g., p > 0.05) indicate a lack of true difference 
between the average ranked overrun. Significance levels of 0.10 are not uncommon in 
statistical analyses. A higher level of confidence was utilized in testing to ensure future 
research focuses solely on those factors which have a high probability of affecting project 
performance.  
An additional step is required to determine which of the factors within each 
attribute experienced greater overrun among the significant pairwise comparisons. The 
average rankings can then be compared using the ranking distance relationship figures. 
The larger the average ranked overrun value, the greater the amount of overrun 
experienced by each factor.  
Contracting Agent 
Descriptive Statistics 
The contracting agent attribute is composed of six individual agents, including 
AFCEC, USACE, NAVFAC, ARNG, Base, and Other. When the contracting agent is 
listed as base, it implies that the contract execution was handled at the base level instead 
of being contracted out to AFCEC, USACE, or NAVFAC. Additionally, when the 
contracting agent is listed as other, it implies that a higher-level agent like a MAJCOM or 




Table A-1 The number and percentage of projects awarded by each contracting agent. 
Agent Frequency Percent 
 AFCEC 152 .2 
ARNG 321 .5 




Other 10520 16.0 
USACE 10280 15.6 
Total 65791 100.0 
 
 
Table A-1 above shows the number of projects executed by each contracting agent over 
the past ten years. Base and NAVFAC agencies executed the majority of projects.  
Statistical Comparison 
A comparison between the contracting agents’ effect on both cost and schedule 
overrun was conducted to determine if any single agent significantly impacts project 
performance. Regarding cost overrun, the significant differences in performance between 
agents are noted in the rows where the adjusted significance is less than 0.05. These 
values are also highlighted in yellow.  
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Figure A-1 Average ranked cost overrun comparisons by contract agent. 
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AFCEC, as a sponsor of this research, was interested in understanding how they 
compared with other agents. An output of this analysis is found in Figure A-1. There 
were only two statistically significant pairwise comparisons that included AFCEC.  
Accordingly, when compared to NAVFAC and ARNG agents, AFCEC experienced a 
greater average ranked cost overrun. AFCEC also wanted to understand how they fared 
when compared to USACE. The adjusted significance of that comparison reveals that 
neither agent outperformed the other. Their average ranked cost overrun values found in 
the distance/relationship figure were very similar.   
It should also be noted that projects executed at the base level were no more likely 
to experience cost overrun than those executed by USACE or AFCEC. This overrun 
could result from the difference in size between the types of projects executed between 
these agents. If, however, larger Air Force projects are traditionally executed by AFCEC 
and USACE, then based on these results, a smaller amount of cost overrun is incurred at 
the base level.  
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Figure A-2 Average ranked schedule overrun comparisons by contract agent. 
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Similar to cost, schedule overrun was similarly affected by each of the factors 
within the contracting agent. That is to say, a similar number of statistically significant 
comparisons exists. As shown in Figure A-2, AFCEC construction projects experienced 
the largest average ranked schedule overrun of all the contracting agents. NAVFAC 
projects experienced the least overrun, followed by ARNG, Other, Base, and USACE. 
Like cost, the amount of schedule overrun experienced by projects could likely increase 
with its size based on these results.  
Funding Agent 
Descriptive Statistics 
The funding agent attribute is composed of six individual agents, including 
AFCEC, USACE, NAVFAC, ARNG, Base, and Other. When the contracting agent is 
listed as base, it implies that the contract funding was provided from the base level. 
Additionally, when the contracting agent is listed as other, it means that a higher-level 
agent like a MAJCOM or HQ funded the project. 
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Table A-2 The number and percentage of projects awarded by each funding agent. 
Agent Frequency Percent 
 AFCEC 158 .2 
ARNG 52 .1 
Base 40459 61.5 
NAVFAC 3802 5.8 
Other 15022 22.8 
USACE 6298 9.6 
Total 65791 100.0 
 
 
Table A-2 shows the number of projects funded by each of the agents. Note that a 
majority of projects were funded at the base level. The next most frequent source of 
funding was other, implying that MAJCOM or their equivalents were used. 
Statistical Comparison 
It was assumed that, like the contracting agent, the funding agent also played a 
role in a project’s likelihood to experience cost and schedule overrun. At least in terms of 
FPDS data, the funding agent is the party responsible for the preponderance of the funds 
for the requirement (i.e., project). Traditionally this also means that that same party 
establishes the initial requirements. As the initial requirements can dictate how a project 
performs throughout its duration, this attribute may give insight into each of these agents’ 
ability to communicate a project’s overall scope consistently and effectively. 
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Figure A-3 Average ranked cost overrun comparisons by funding agent. 
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As shown above in Figure A-3, a majority of funding agents have a significant 
statistical difference between one another regarding project cost overrun. Again, AFCEC 
has the largest average ranked cost overrun of any of the funding agencies. ARNG was 
the agency with the least average ranked overrun, followed by NAVFAC, Other, Base, 
and USACE. Similar to the contracting agent attribute, when USACE or AFCEC was the 




Figure A-4 Average ranked schedule overrun comparisons by funding agent. 
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The order of performance for the funding agents’ average ranked schedule 
overrun is the same for cost. The only difference here is that three fewer comparisons 
were statistically different, as shown above in Figure A-4.   
Award Month 
Descriptive Statistics 
The award month of the project was assumed, at least anecdotally, to influence the 
amount of overrun a project would experience. The assumption being that those projects 
issued close to the end of the fiscal year would experience more overrun based on their 
perceived lack of scoping or definition.  
 
Table A-3 The number and percentage of projects awarded in each month. 
Month Frequency Percent 
 April 3958 6.0 
August 7452 11.3 
December 2011 3.1 
February 2618 4.0 
January 2210 3.4 
July 6554 10.0 
June 5683 8.6 
March 3849 5.9 
May 4561 6.9 
November 1416 2.2 
October 1337 2.0 
September 24142 36.7 
Total 65791 100.0 
 
As indicated in Table A-3 that the DoD executed a large portion of projects in 
September. Additionally, the results presented earlier showed that a greater percentage of 
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projects awarded in September experienced overruns than other months. However, these 
statistics alone cannot be used to determine whether or not the month of September is the 
cause of increased overruns within projects. As this month contains a large percentage of 
projects, greater variability in performance is expected. Therefore, projects awarded in 
September would need to be investigated further to identify the factors correlated with 
overruns.  
Statistical Comparison 
The statistical comparison results revealed additional information about the end of 
the fiscal year concerning cost and schedule overrun. These comparisons are visualized in 
Figure A-5, Figure A-6, Figure A-7, and Figure A-8. The months of July, August, and 
September were higher in average ranked overrun than other months in most cases. These 
results indicate that, generally, projects awarded in the final quarter of the fiscal year 
experience more overrun than those in other quarters.  
 
 
















In all cases except one, the comparisons revealed that projects awarded in 
September experienced more average ranked cost overrun than in any other month. The 
only other month to experience a similar amount of overrun was October. It’s not clear 
from this statistical analysis why that is. As October is the beginning of the fiscal year, an 
increased average ranked cost overrun could result from a premature project award. In a 
rush to obligate the initial disbursement of funds, projects could be prone to the same lack 
of scoping and definition that likely occurs in September. With fewer projects issued in 
October than in any other month, the overrun amount is comparatively worse than in 
September and should be investigated further. 
In every comparison made, projects awarded in September experienced a 
significantly greater average ranked overrun than any other month. This result reveals the 
increased likelihood of projects to experience schedule overrun when awarded in 
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